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1Abstract
This thesis explores vertical integration in both competitive and 
noncompetitive settings. Chapter 2 shows that allocation of ownership matters 
even in a repeated relationship. The optimal control structure of the static game 
restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be 
minimal. The worst ownership structure of the one-shot game is good in the 
repeated setting because it provides the highest punishment but bad because the 
gain from deviation is also the highest. We show that two types of equilibria 
exist: one where partnership and a hostage type solution are optimal and second 
where the results of the one-shot game apply.
Chapter 3 focuses on vertical oligopolies when both integrated and 
unintegrated firms coexist. We analyse the integrated firm's strategy in the 
input market. If the integrated firm is more efficient in transforming the input 
into final good, it will buy some input to drive up rival's marginal cost. Only if 
the integrated firm is less efficient will it sell input. If there is no competition 
in the final good market vertical supply arises because it has no harmful effects 
on the downstream unit's profits. If competition is very tough overbuying will 
emerge; by raising rival's costs the integrated firm can achieve a dominant 
position in a highly competitive market.
Chapter 4 examines integration decisions of successive duopolists. We 
show that qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges whether there is 
Cournot or Bertrand competition in the input market. We find that the degree 
of integration in the industry is increasing in the size of the downstream market. 
There is a tendency for partial integration when one upstream firm is relatively 
efficient compared to its rival.
Chapter 5 takes into account both the firm's internal and external 
environment. Further, we explicitly model the effect of varying the degree of 
market competition. We observe a non-monotonic relationship between 
ownership allocation and competition. We also see greater upstream ownership 
of assets when the upstream worker is important.
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51 Introduction
This thesis explores vertical integration in both competitive and noncompetitive 
settings. We apply two approaches to integration. The incomplete contracting 
approach takes the view that different units of the firm are run by separate managers 
who are self-interested and cannot be made to act in the best interest of the firm 
because of incompleteness of contracts.1 The managers make a firm-specific 
investment ex ante. Since contracts contingent on investments cannot be written the 
bargaining over the surplus occurs after the investments are made. The managers 
foresee that part of the surplus they generate by their investment is expropriated in the 
bargaining while they pay the full cost of investment. Therefore distortions in 
investments arise. Ownership matters because it affects the outside options and 
therefore the outcome of the bargaining game and the incentives to invest.
The second branch of literature assumes that integration leads to profit sharing 
and removes all the conflicts of interest inside the firm thus giving the main emphasis 
on the strategic interaction between the firms.2 The main issue is how integration 
affects the industry cost structure and the competition in the downstream market. The 
integration structure is used as a device to change the industry cost structure to the 
benefit of the firm making the integration decision or of all the industry. Also the 
possibility of foreclosure of nonintegrated rivals is explored.
1 William son (1975) and (1985), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart 
and Moore (1990) and Bolton and Whinston (1993).
2Vickers (1985), Bonnano and Vickers (1988), Salinger (1988), Hart and Tirole (1990), Ordover, 
Saloner and Salop (1990) and Gal-Or (1992).
6Chapter 2 "Reputation and Allocation of Ownership" adopts the incomplete 
contracting approach. According to this approach holdup problems arise because of the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour. If the agents are in a repeated relationship and 
care about the future any one-shot gain from opportunistic behaviour should be 
outweighed by the loss of trust in the future. We examine if  there is any scope for 
allocation of ownership in the dynamic setup. We show that allocation of ownership 
indeed matters unless agents are very patient. Two types of equilibria can arise: one 
where partnership and a hostage type solution are optimal and second where the results 
of the one-shot game apply. The ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best 
incentives to cooperate. The best ownership structure is such that the gain from 
deviation is lowest relative to the punishment The main trade-off is the followiiig: the 
worst ownership structure of the one-shot game provides maximal punishment but also 
the gain from deviation will be the highest while the optimal control structure of the 
static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the smallest but also the punishment 
will be minimal. The worst ownership structure of the one-shot game is the one that 
does not give agents any outside options and therefore the noncooperative investments 
are lowest and the punishment is highest. If an agent cheats in investment the 
cooperation breaks down immediately; the surplus will be divided noncooperatively. 
When the agents do not have outside options the bargaining will result in an even split 
of the surplus; the deviant gets half of the surplus generated by opponent’s first-best 
investment and gains a lot from deviation. While when the agents have an outside 
option the opponent has a high one since his investment is high and therefore the 
deviant cannot extract as large share of its value as in the previous case. We show that 
there are two types of equilibria depending on the parameter values. Partnership and a 
hostage type solution arise in equilibrium when it is important to maximize 
punishment. The results of the one-shot game broadly apply when minimizing the gain 
from deviation is dominant.
7Chapters 3, 4 and 5 explore competitive settings. The broad theme in these 
Chapters is the industry cost structure and the toughness of competition. In Chapter 3 
"Vertical Supply, Foreclosure and Overbuying" we examine how these factors affect 
the integrated firm's strategy in the input market; does it participate in the market as a 
buyer or seller or does it participate at all. The integrated firm may choose to buy 
some input in the market although internal supplies would be cheaper. Overbuying 
drives up the unintegrated rival's marginal costs and the integrated firm is in a better 
competitive position in the final good market. This comes at a cost; the average (but 
not the marginal) cost increases. In some other circumstances the integrated firm may 
sell input to its rival. It understands that this input will ultimately compete with its 
own final good but the upstream unit makes a profit from input sales. We show that 
with Cournot competition and homogeneous final goods the integrated firm will 
overbuy when it is more or equally efficient in transforming the input into the final 
good than its unintegrated rival. If it is already in a strong position in the downstream 
market it can afford to raise average costs somewhat in order to gain an even stronger 
position. Only if the integrated firm is less efficient will it find it optimal to sell input. 
If the downstream market does not offer much, it may pay to shift attention to input 
sales and at least make a profit from that. Furthermore, if the integrated firm is very 
inefficient in the final good production it will drop out from the downstream market 
and concentrate fully on input production. The second crucial issue for the integrated 
firm's strategy is the toughness of competition in the downstream market. If there is no 
competition (the firms operate in different markets) input sales bring revenues to the 
integrated firm and it has no harmful effects whatsoever on its downstream profit; 
therefore vertical supply occurs. When competition is tough it becomes important for 
the integrated firm not to help its rival to compete against itself; vertical supply is not 
optimal. If the firms are equally efficient the integrated firm can achieve a cost
8advantage by overbuying input. This gives it a dominant position in a highly 
competitive market; overbuying emerges in equilibrium.
Whereas Chapter 3 took the industry structure as given, Chapter 4 "Endogenous 
Industry Structure in Vertical Duopoly" analyses how the industry cost structure and 
toughness of competition in the input market affect the integration decision and how 
this can induce further cost changes. We compare two models; one with extreme 
Bertrand competition in the input market and one with less severe Cournot competition. 
We show that qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges in both models. 
We find that the firms integrate as a result of rising demand. Porter and Livesay 
(1971) and Chandler (1977) provide empirical support for this prediction. Furthermore, 
there is a tendency for asymmetric industry structure when one upstream firm is 
relatively efficient compared to its rival.
In Chapter 5 "Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration and Product Market 
Competition" the industry cost structure arises from a more fundamental source and the 
strategy in the input market is part of the integration decision. This chapter is a 
synthesis of the two approaches to integration; we take into account both the firm's 
internal and external (competitive) environment. Suppose there is an upstream firm, a 
downstream firm and an integrated firm owned by its downstream manager. Each 
production unit has a manager who can enhance the value of the firm's product by 
exerting effort. The integrated firm could use internal input but since that is of low 
value (the non-owning manager of the upstream unit has low incentives to improve its 
value) it will choose to buy from the independent supplier. The integrated firm can get 
a large share of the surplus when negotiating with the supplier since it has an outside 
option to use internal supplies while the nonintegrated downstream firm is fully 
dependent on these supplies; therefore the manager of the integrated firm has higher
9incentives to improve the value of its final good than the manager of the nonintegrated 
firm. Since there are no capacity constraints an efficient supply arrangement is for the 
independent upstream firm to supply both downstream units and this is what we would 
expect in noncompetitive environment. As competition gets tougher in the downstream 
market the nonintegrated firm suffers since its product is of lower value. It may pay 
for the nonintegrated downstream firm to buy up the input supplier. Then input will be 
inferior but the other firm suffers too and the firms are in equal footing. However, if 
competition gets really tough then the final good market offers little attraction. In 
which case it may be best to effectively withdraw from the final market and 
concentrate on input production. This can be achieved by giving the ownership of the 
upstream unit to its manager. There is therefore a non-monotonic relationship between 
ownership allocation and competition.
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2 Reputation and Allocation of Ownership
2.1 Introduction
A recent theory of vertical integration relates to situations where contracts are 
incomplete and parties make specific investments ex ante.3 Since contracts contingent 
on investments cannot be written bargaining over the surplus occurs after the 
investments have been made. The agent foresees that part of her investment can be 
expropriated in ex post bargaining while she pays the full cost of investment. 
Therefore distortions in investments typically arise. According to this theory the 
ownership rights should be allocated to minimize these distortions. When the parties 
are in a repeated relationship and care about the future, any one-shot gain from 
opportunistic behaviour should be outweighed by the loss of trust in the future.4 Can 
first best be achieved under any ownership structure? Is there any scope for allocation 
of ownership in the repeated relationship? These are the issues raised in this paper.
We show that allocation of ownership indeed matters even in a repeated 
relationship (unless agents are very patient). Two types of equilibria exist: one where 
partnership and a hostage type solution are optimal and second where the results of the 
one-shot game apply.
The ownership structure is chosen to give the agents best incentives to 
cooperate. The best ownership structure is such that the gain from deviation is lowest 
relative to the punishment. One might expect that the optimal ownership structure in
3WilIiamson (1975) and (1985), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and more formally Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Bolton and Whinston (1993).
4See Macaulay (1963) for empirical evidence of reputation effects.
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the repeated game is the worst structure of the one-shot game (no outside options) 
because it provides the highest punishment. However, the highest punishment does not 
imply that cooperation would be most sustainable. It is also true that when the 
punishment is highest so is the gain from deviation. When an agent deviates in 
investment the cooperation breaks down immediately: the surplus will be divided 
noncooperatively. When there are no outside options the bargaining will result in an 
even split of the surplus; the deviant gets half of the surplus generated by the 
opponent’s first-best investment and gains a lot from deviation. While when the agents 
have outside options then the deviant cannot extract as much as half of the value of the 
efficient investment in bargaining. The trade-off present in the repeated game is the 
following. Ownership structure with no outside options is good because it provides the 
highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation is also the highest. The 
optimal control structure of the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the 
lowest but also the punishment will be minimal. We show that two types of equilibria 
exist: one where ownership is allocated to maximize punishment and another where a 
control structure that best limits the gain from deviation is chosen.
We show that partnership with a unanimity clause is optimal in a repeated game 
when the investment costs are very convex. The agents cannot use the assets unless 
they reach a unanimous agreement; cheating would lead to an outcome with very low 
surplus in the future and punishment is maximal. Partnership is optimal if compared to 
the optimal structure of the one shot game the relative increase in the punishment is 
greater than the relative increase in the gain from deviation. When investment costs 
are steeply increasing the gain from deviation is high; the first-best investment is 
expensive and cheating would lead to a big saving in investment costs. In the same 
time punishment is relatively low; the first-best surplus is not very high when the high 
investment is expensive. When the gain is high and the punishment is low it is easier
14
to obtain a higher relative change in punishment. It is optimal to put all the weight in 
maximizing punishment although then also the gain from deviation will be the highest; 
partnership is optimal. Reputation effects thus provide a new explanation for 
partnerships.5
When only one agent has an investment an equally good structure is one where 
the noninvesting agent owns both assets. This is a hostage type solution to prevent 
opportunism as discussed in Williamson (1983) and (1985). The investing agent is 
very vulnerable; she does not have access to her essential asset without the consent of 
the other agent. Any opportunistic behaviour would lead to a very bad equilibrium. 
Franchising provides an example of hostages: sometimes the franchisor may require 
franchisees to rent from them short term the land on which their outlet is located.
When investment costs are almost linear there exists an equilibrium where 
broadly the results of the one-shot game apply (Hart and Moore (1990)). The optimal 
control structure gives the agents the highest possible outside options and therefore best 
restricts the gain from deviation. For not very convex investment costs the gain from 
deviation is low and the punishment is high and it is easier to induce higher relative 
change in the gain; thus it is optimal to minimize the gain from deviation. One 
important determinant for the optimal ownership structure is the degree of 
complementarity between the assets; when the assets are strictly complementary they 
should be owned together while if they are economically independent each agent 
should control her asset. The second result relates to the importance of agent's 
investment; if  only one agent has an investment she should own both assets. Lastly, if 
an agent is very important as a trading partner so that without his contribution this asset
5Radner (1986) shows that partnership can be efficient in a repeated came but he does not provide an 
explanation for why partnership would be better than some other organizational form.
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does not improve the other agent's incentives, then he should own the asset. 
Interestingly the predictions of the one-shot and the repeated game do not fully 
coincide in this parameter range: integration is less likely in the repeated game. Klein 
(1980) and Coase (1988) suggest that reputation and integration are substitutes in 
dealing with the problem of opportunism. They refer to models where the benefit of 
integration is reduced holdups and the costs of integration are something else (for 
example arising from bureaucracy). Clearly then reputation concerns make integration 
less likely; the benefits are lower and the costs have not changed. In our model both 
the benefits and costs of integration change and it is not a priori clear which way the 
reputation effect goes. It turns out that integration is less likely.
Garvey (1991) also analyses the effect of reputation on the optimal allocation of 
ownership rights in a two-agent two-asset setup. He finds that the basic result of 
Grossman and Hart (1986) holds in the repeated setting: an agent with a much more 
important investment should own both assets. Garvey takes ownership as a continuous 
variable and assumes that the asset returns accrue to the owner whereas Grossman and 
Hart assume that ownership increases a manager's bargaining power only by raising his 
outside option.6 Thus his model is not in fact a repeated version of Grossman-Hart. 
Furthermore, Garvey restricts the division of surplus to be the same under cooperation 
and noncooperation whereas we take into account that other sharing rules than the 
outcome of the one-shot bargaining game may be supported under cooperation. In 
addition we examine the role of outside options.
Friedman and Thisse (1991) have a related paper to ours. In their model the 
firms choose noncooperatively the location in the Hotelling line and then collude in
6Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) on the other hand make the same assumption about the ownership of 
asset returns as Garvey.
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pricing in the repeated game. They find that the firms will locate in the middle of the 
Hotelling line to make deviations very costly. Another paper that obtains an inefficient 
structure from a static point of view as an equilibrium in a dynamic context is 
Martimort (1993). He shows that multiprincipals charter acts as a commitment device 
against principal's incentives to renegotiate long term agreements. Both these papers 
obtain the reverse structure as the only equilibrium. In our model also the outcome of 
the static game can be an equilibrium in the dynamic game within some parameter 
range.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces our main 
model where only one agent has an investment. Section 2.3 briefly discusses the 
results of the one-shot game. The repeated game is analysed in Section 2.4. In Section
2.5 we extend the model to include investment by both agents.
2.2 The Model
Our stage game is a simplified version of Hart and Moore (1990). We analyse a 
setup where worker 1 uses asset a1 to supply worker 2 who in turn uses asset a2 to 
supply consumers. Ex ante worker 1 makes an investment in human capital which is 
specific to asset The investment is denoted by I. The investment makes the worker 
more productive in using the asset. The worker for example learns to know better the 
properties of the asset or the environment the firm operates and can therefore generate 
more surplus. The investment can be either cost reducing or value enhancing. The 
investment generates a gross surplus equal to v(I). The cost of the investment to 
worker 1 is c(I). We make the following assumptions about the value and cost of 
investment:
17
Assumption 2.1. v(0) > 0 , v’(7) > 0 and v” (I) < 0.
Assumption 2.2. c(0) = 0 , c’(I) > 0 and c” (I) > 0.
For simplicity we assume that agent 2 does not have an investment. His contribution to 
the joint surplus is a fixed value, V. Accordingly the joint surplus is equal to:
(2.1) V + v(I) - c(I).
Investment in human capital is assumed to be too complex to be described 
adequately in a contract. It is observable to both agents but not verifiable to third 
parties like the court. Therefore agent 1 chooses the investment noncooperatively. We 
also assume that it is very difficult to describe the required input characteristics or 
worker's duties ex ante. As a result the input trade and nonowning worker's wage is 
also ex ante noncontractible. We also rule out profit-sharing agreements.7 Ex ante 
contracts can only be written on the allocation of ownership. The possible ownership 
structures are nonintegration (each asset is owned by its worker), integration by agent i 
(agent i owns both assets), joint ownership (the agents jointly own both assets) and 
cross ownership (agent 1 owns asset a2 and 2 owns a^ .
The assets do not necessarily fully rely on each other but there can be other 
suppliers/customers available. When each agent owns her asset, worker 1 can produce 
the input and sell it to an outsider and worker 2 can buy input from an outsider and 
produce final good from it. The value of this trade to agents 1 and 2 is assumed to be 
pv(I) and pV  respectively. The value of p  depends on the relationship between the 
assets. When the assets are strictly complementary (there are no alternative
7See Hart and Moore (1990) for the justification of these assumptions.
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suppliers/customers), then n  = 0. The assets are economically independent when agent 
i can realize the full value without agent j  and asset ay In this case fi = 1. When the 
assets are economically independent l's input is in no way specific for 2 who can 
obtain equally good input from alternative suppliers. Also 1 has alternative customers 
who value the input as much as agent 2.
If an agent owns both assets she can work alone with them and sell the final 
good to the customers. If agent 1 is the owner the value of the trade without agent 2's 
contribution is X2 [v(I) + and if 2 is the owner the value is Xj(V + A ). A is 
related to the value of asset a. without its worker. The value of X. depends on the 
importance of agent i as a trading partner. If agent i is indispensable to asset a. so that 
giving the control of a. to agent j  (who already owns aj) does not enhance the surplus 
he can generate on his own by asset a., then X. = fi. If agent i is dispensable so that 
agent j  could replace her by an outsider without loss of value, then X. = 1. /x is the 
lowerbound for X.; an agent cannot do worse when she owns both assets than when she 
owns only one.
When an agent does not control any asset on her own (nonowning worker of an 
integrated firm or a partner in joint ownership) she has an outside option to work for 
another firm. We assume that asset a1 is essential to worker 1 (or l's investment is 
fully specific to so that the outside wage does not depend on her investment. 
Without loss of generality we normalize this fixed wage to zero.
Under cross ownership agent i can use asset a. for outside trade which has value 
jjAj. This value does not depend on l's investment because she does not have access to 
her essential asset.
19
We summarize the agents' outside options in Assumption 2.3. We denote by 
v(iA )  the value agent i can generate on her own when she controls a set A of assets.
Assumption 2.3. v(7,{</>}) = 0, v(7,{<*7}) = jJiv(I), v(2,{a2}) = jxV, v(i,{a .}) = fiA., 
v ( l ,{a r a2})  = X2 [v(I) + A2] and v(2,{ar a2}) = + A}) fo r  i j  = 7,2 and i ± j.
Assumption 2.4. 0 < fj,< X.< 1 for i = 7,2, 0 < A ^ <  v(0) and 0 < A 2 <V.
Assumption 2.4 says that the marginal value of investment is increasing in the 
number of agents and assets. The assumption furthermore ensures superadditivity: 
under any ownership structure the joint surplus is at least as great as the sum of the 
agents' outside options.
Ex post the uncertainty is resolved and the agents negotiate a spot contract on 
the input trade or the services of non-owning workers. The investment is observable to 
both agents at the time of bargaining. The incentive of the bargaining parties to reach 
agreement is driven by the risk of breakdown of negotiation. This will result in the 
"split-the-difference" rule where each agent gets half of the gains from trade.8 Finally, 
production occurs and the final good is sold to the customers. This completes the 
description of the stage game.
In our dynamic model the stage game described above is always repeated one 
more period with high probability. At date 0 the agents write a contract on the 
allocation of ownership to maximize the joint surplus. The contract can give the 
ownership of an asset to the same agent(s) for all the game or induce changes in
8Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Sutton (1986).
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ownership. Given our assumptions about contractibility the only event this contract can 
be contingent on is time. Skills depreciate and the environment changes and further 
investments can be made in the beginning of each period. We make the extreme 
assumption that the investment depreciates fully before the next period begins. In the 
second half of the period the gains from trade are realized and the spot contract on the 
division of surplus is written. The time line of the game is:
0 1 2
i-----------------   1--------------- 1-------- -
contract on investment spot trade investment spot trade 
ownership
2.3 One-Shot Game
In this section we briefly examine the static game. Equation (2.2) gives the
*
joint surplus maximizing investment, I  :
(2.2) V (I*) - c’(I*) = 0
Since ex ante contracts on input trade or wage cannot be written, the bargaining 
takes place after the investment is made. Agent 1 foresees that part of the surplus she 
generates by her investment is expropriated in ex post bargaining while she pays the 
full cost of investment. Therefore underinvestment (holdup) typically arises. 
Ownership is allocated to induce the highest investment. Below we give the outcome 
of the bargaining game and the incentives to invest under each ownership structure.
21
Under nonintegration (NI) the owners negotiate a two-part tariff on the input 
trade. The unit price is equal to marginal cost and the bargaining is over the fixed fee. 
The bargaining will result in the following division of surplus:
(2.3) P *  = ^[(1+n)v(I) + a-H)V] - c(I)
(2.4) = \ [ ( l  -n)v(I) + (l+ n )\q
Accordingly the incentive for investing is:
(2.5) ^<1+m)vY/) - c ’(I) = 0
It is easy to see from equation (2.5) that the investment is the greater the less 
complementary the assets are (the higher is fi). When the assets are economically 
independent (j j l  = 1) agent 1 has first-best incentives.
Under integration by agent 1 (II) the owner of both assets can unilaterally 
decide to transfer input at marginal cost but she has to bargain with agent 2 for his 
services. The payoffs for the agents are:
(2.6) P 1/  = |[ ( 1 + X2)v(I) + V + A / 2] - c(I)
(2.7) P'2‘ = ^[(1 -X2M D  + V - A / 2]
The investment is given by:
(2.8) ^1+A2)vY/) - c’(I) = 0
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The investment is the greater the more dispensable the worker is (the higher is A )^. In 
the limit when the worker is fully dispensable (X2 = 1), then the owner has first-best 
incentives. When the worker is indispensable (X2 = fi), then the investment is equal 
under nonintegration and agent 1 control. Assumption 2.4 ensures that agent l's 
investment is at least as great when she owns both assets than when she owns only one 
(A2 M)-
Under integration by agent 2 (21), cross ownership (CO) and joint ownership 
(JO) agent 1 can realize the value of her investment only by reaching an agreement 
with agent 2; her investment has no value if she does not have access to her essential 
asset. Under integration by 2 and cross ownership agent 2 owns her asset and under 
joint ownership the agents have to reach a unanimous agreement to use the assets. 
Therefore agent 1 receives half of the value of her investment at the margin and the 
investment is given by:
(2.9) \v'(I) - c'(I) =  0
Since any fixed outside options do not affect the incentives the size of the surplus is 
equal in these three structures - the division of surplus differs in general.
In this setup the ownership decision is very simple. We should allocate 
ownership to give agent 1 the highest incentives, that is to give her the highest outside 
option related to investment. Since by assumption %2 > p  concentrating ownership of 
both assets in l's hands gives her the best incentives and generates the highest surplus 
(see first order conditions (2.5), (2.8) and (2.9)). If assets are economically 
independent (p  = 1) or agent 2 is indispensable (%2 = p)> then nonintegration and
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integration by agent 1 are equally good. Furthermore, joint ownership, cross ownership 
and integration by agent 2 are strictly dominated for any fi and %2 > 0.9
2.4 Repeated Game
When the agents are in a repeated relationship and care about the future, the 
holdup problems described in the previous section should not be so severe. In this 
section we analyse when the efficient investment can be supported using the trigger 
strategy and Nash punishments. Obviously if  the agents are very patient (discount 
factor is close to one) first best can be supported under any ownership structure. We 
are interested in situations when the agents are not completely patient and our aim is to 
find an ownership structure that guarantees first best for the greatest range of discount 
factors.
Agent 1 implicitly agrees to make the efficient investment and both agents
* *
implicitly agree to share the surplus according to (P1J32)' (The sharing rule will be
determined later.) Deviation from either investment or sharing rule will trigger
noncooperative behaviour from the opponent for the rest of the game. In particular, if
agent 1 cheats in investment the cooperation breaks down already in the second half of
the day: the surplus will be divided noncooperatively. Also if there is no deviation in
* *
investment but an agent does not agree to follow the sharing rule (F ^ />2), then 
noncooperative bargaining will take place. The trigger strategy for agent 1 is:
9When %2 = n = 0 all ownership structures are equally good.
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* * * 
in period 1 choose I  and follow (PiyP^)
if (P^ 2 ) in l,2,...,f-l, then choose I  and follow (PjJP^  in t
if not ^ en c^oose ^  and apply (P^yP^) in where
superscript N  refers to the Nash equilibrium of the static game
if not t*ien aPP^ ^ 1^ 2)  *** ^ + 1’— anc* choose /*  in f+l,f+2,...
and for agent 2:
if I  = /  in l,2,...,f and (Pj*P2) then follow (PltP 2) in t
if  either 1 * 1  in t or not (P ^ JP )^ in f-1 or t, then apply (P^J^) in t,t+1,...
Note that the only relevant information about the previous period when a new 
period begins is whether there was or was not deviation. Whether the deviation was in 
investment or sharing rule does not matter. This also means that the extensive form 
and the outcome of the bargaining game for the static model (as proposed in Sutton 
(1986)) is appropriate also here for the punishment phase. Whether the agents reach an 
agreement or fail to do so and have to take the outside option this period does not 
change the rest of the game. The next period starts from the same node.
It is easy to see that cheating in investment dominates cheating in sharing rule 
for agent 1. When 1 deviates in investment, she chooses her investment taking into 
account that the surplus will be divided noncooperatively. (The deviation investment is 
thus equal to the investment in the one-shot game.) By definition this is more than 
making the first-best investment and then switching to noncooperative bargaining. 
Only when agent 1 does not have an incentive to cheat in investment (she has first-best 
incentives even in the one-shot game) might she choose to deviate in sharing rule. 
Obviously agent 2 can cheat only in sharing rule since he does not have an investment.
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First best will be supported in equilibrium if and only if the discounted payoff 
stream from cooperation exceeds the payoff stream from the deviation path for both 
agents.
(2.10) (1 + 5  + S2 + ...) [T - c(/*)] > P d] + ( S + S 2 + ...)!*
(2.11) (1 + 5 + 52 + ...)[V + v(I*) -T \ > P d2 + (S +  82 + ...)fP
where 8  is the discount factor, T  is the transfer agent 1 receives from 2 under
j
cooperation, P  is i's one-shot deviation payoff and P . is i's payoff in the punishment 
path. If agent 1 deviates in investment, agent 2 observes it already in the same period 
and he will not pay T  to agent 1. Agent 1 saves in investment costs but receives now a 
share of the surplus that is determined by noncooperative bargaining. Since agent 2
j  M
can punish only by sharing rule and the punishment starts in the same period P j = Pj 
and there is in fact no trade-off from gain today versus punishment tomorrow for agent 
1. Equation (2.10) simplifies to:
(2.12) T -c ( I * )> P P1
Equation (2.12) is the incentive compatibility constraint for agent 1 and it does not 
depend on the discount factor - not because future would not matter but because it 
affects both sides of (2.12) equally. For example under nonintegration agent 1 chooses 
efficient investment if and only if:
(2.13) T > ^1+m )v(/") + ^ l-n )V  - c ( f )  + c(I*)
where f*1 is the Nash investment under nonintegration.
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Agent 2's incentive constraint (2.11) depends on the discount factor. The higher
share of the surplus goes to agent 1 under cooperation, the less likely it is that 2 will
*
cooperate. Therefore the best we can do is to choose T  such that (2.12) is just 
satisfied. This proves that:
Proposition 2.1. When only agent 1 has an investment the optimal sharing rule is:
T = + c(I )
^  71
P  = Pp 1 1
* * * n 
P 2 = V + v(I ) - c ( I  ) - P pJ.
Note that this arrangement gives agent 1 the same surplus as in the one-shot 
game and the non-investing agent 2 gets all the benefits from I's higher investment.
*
If agent 2 chooses to cheat in sharing rule, he does not have to pay T to agent 
1 but the transfer is determined in noncooperative bargaining. His gain from deviation 
under nonintegration is:
(2.14) ( f 1 = [^ l+H )V  + j(l-jU)v(/*)] - [V + v(/*) - T ]
= [^1+M)v(/W) - c(INI)] - [ ^ l + z W )  - c(/*)]
where G = P ^ - P This expression is strictly positive for any f*1 < I  since jNI is
chosen to maximize the first term is square brackets. The same is true for any
ownership structure and therefore agent 2 can gain by cheating; he can extract more of
*
the value of I's efficient investment in bargaining than by paying T  . If agent 1 has 
first-best incentives in the one-shot game (f*1 = I  ) there is no reason to deviate for 
agent 2 either since then he cannot extract any value of I's investment in bargaining 
(see equation (2.4)).
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If agent 2 cheats in sharing rule he gains in this period but from the next period 
on the payoff will be lower because agent 1 chooses Nash investment. Under 
nonintegration the loss from deviation is equal to:
(2.15) Lm  = [V + v(I*) - T ]  - fy l+ n )V  +
= [v(/*) - c(/*>] - [vd® ) - c ( /" ) ]
n -gNI  ^ ^
where L = P 2 - P^. Loss is strictly positive for any f  < I  since I  maximizes the 
first term in square brackets. L  shows how much lower the joint surplus will be in the 
punishment path. If agent 2 is patient enough the one-shot gain from cheating is 
outweighed by lower payoff in the future. Agent 2's incentive constraint (2.11) 
simplifies to:
(2.16) 8 > G / ( G  + L).
The main focus of this paper is on equation (2.16). The gain and loss from deviation 
will differ in general for different ownership structures. Define 8  = G/(G + L). In what 
follows we concentrate on finding the control structure that guarantees first best for the 
greatest range of discount factors, that is gives the lowest 8. The best ownership 
structure is such that the gain from deviation is lowest relative to the loss. Now it 
becomes clear that the optimal allocation gives the ownership to the same agent(s) for 
all the game. For example giving ownership of the assets to agent 1 for the first t 
periods and then making agent 2 the owner for the rest of the game does not improve 
the incentives to cooperate in any way (it may do no harm either if 8  is equal under 
both control structures).
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It is quite obvious that if agent 1 has fust-best incentives even in the one-shot 
game (5 = 0) under some ownership structure this must be the optimal structure also for 
the repeated game. This gives our first results on the optimal control structure:
Proposition 2.2.
(i) I f  assets are economically independent (p  = 1), then nonintegration is (weakly) 
optimal.
(ii) I f  the non-investing agent 2 is dispensable (X2 = 1), then integration by agent 1 is 
(weakly) optimal.
In these cases agent 2 does not have any holdup power and cannot get any share of the 
value of Ts investment in bargaining; therefore agent 1 has always first-best incentives 
(see equations (2.5) and (2.8)).
Next we turn to analyse the optimal ownership structure when there is 
underinvestment problem in the one-shot game, that is p  and X2 < 1. We know that G 
and L are strictly positive in this case. Then it is appropriate to determine the optimal 
control structure by minimizing the right-hand-side of (2.16).10 Furthermore 0 < 5 < 1; 
if agent 2 is very patient first best can be supported under any ownership structure and 
if 2 is very impatient underinvestment will occur.
It turns out that as in the one-shot game any fixed values do not affect the 
incentives. (V cancels out in equations (2.14) and (2.15).) Only outside options related 
to investments and consequently the level of Nash investment are important. Therefore
10When ju = 1 then both the numerator and denominator of equation (2.16) are equal to zero under 
nonintegration and the same is true under integration by agent 1 when %2 = 1.
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we can obtain the gain and loss from deviation for cross ownership, joint ownership 
and agent 2 control from equations (2.14) and (2.15) by setting fi equal to zero and 
changing the Nash investment level to be appropriate. This proves that:
Lemma 2.1. t f °  = § f°  = S2!.
Not only are cross ownership, joint ownership and agent 2 control equivalent but from 
the point of view of the static game these are the structures one would not expect to be 
useful. The common element in these structures is that they do not give control rights 
to the investing agent 1.
Since only the level of Nash investment affects 8  it is clear that:
Lemma 2.2.
a) f(x2) = s 'V )  if = m-
(ii) 8ll(0) = f ( 0 )  = f °  = t f °  = 82'.
When agent 2 is indispensable (X2 = /i) nonintegration and agent 1 control are 
equivalent since owning both assets rather than only a1 does not improve Ts incentives 
to invest in the punishment path. When the assets are strictly complementary (jj, = 0) 
and agent 2 is indispensable (A2 = 0) neither nonintegration or agent 1 control provides 
any outside option to agent 1. Agent 2 has the maximal holdup power: agent 1 cannot 
do anything without agent 2 or asset a2. Then all the ownership structures are 
equivalent.
Therefore we are left with the question: is 8  minimized by removing agent I's
outside option (joint or cross ownership or agent 2 control) or by giving her an outside
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option (nonintegration or integration by agent 1)? We can derive the optimal control 
structure by examining how the lowerbound for the discount factor under 
nonintegration, ^ Q x ), and under integration, 5^(A2), move with fx and A^ . Since 
Lemma 2.2 shows that & 1 (jx) = 5n (X2) when jx = A2, it is sufficient to concentrate on 
^ ( jx )  only. Examining how jx affects tF1 is like comparing different ownership 
structures.
We start by analysing the gain and loss from deviation.
Proposition 2.3. Both the gain and loss from deviation are decreasing in fx under 
nonintegration.
Proof:
Equation (2.14) gives the gain from deviation under nonintegration. Total 
differentiation gives:
(2.17) d ( f ' /d n  = [ ^ l+ n ) v ' ( f )  - d f ' ld i i  + j M / " )  - v(/*)] =
- v(/*)] < 0
The investment effect is negligible and therefore we can ignore the first term in (2.17). 
Accordingly, the gain is decreasing in fx. Equation (2.15) gives the loss from deviation 
under nonintegration. By total differentiation we obtain:
(2.18) dLNIldn  = - [v'(/W) - cXf11)] d F /d y  = - ^(1 - n y ( f ‘)d F Id u  < 0
The first order condition (2.5) helps us to determine the sign of this expression and to 
simplify it. It is easy to see from (2.5) that d^ /d fx  is positive. Therefore (2.18) is 
unambiguously negative.
Q.E.D.
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High loss and low gain from deviation would guarantee good incentives to 
cooperate. Proposition 2.3 tells that removing agent I's outside option ( j i  = 0) provides 
the highest loss. In the punishment path agent 1 receives only half of the value of her 
investment at the margin and therefore the Nash investment and joint surplus is the 
lowest possible. Nonintegration with \i = 0 is like joint ownership, cross ownership and 
agent 2 control which are the worst structures in the one-shot game. In the repeated 
game these structures have the advantage that they provide the highest punishment.
However, the highest punishment does not imply that cooperation would be 
most sustainable.11 Proposition 2.3 shows that when the punishment is highest so is the 
gain from deviation. When agent 2 deviates in sharing rule the spot contract will be 
written with the split-the-difference rule. When there are no outside options the agents 
simply split the gross surplus 50:50; the deviant gets half of the surplus generated by 
agent I's first-best investment and therefore gains a lot from deviation. While when 
agent 1 has an outside option (ji > 0) agent 2 can extract less than half of the value of 
the efficient investment and therefore gains less from deviation. (Note that the size of 
the surplus does not change for small increase in /t; the investment effect is negligible.) 
The optimal ownership structure of the one-shot game gives the highest possible 
outside option and consequently the highest share of the surplus under noncooperative 
bargaining to the investing agent 1 and therefore best restricts the gain from deviation 
for agent 2. In the same time punishment will be minimal because I's incentive to 
invest in the punishment path is maximized. While the worst structure of the static 
game is good in the repeated game because it provides the highest punishment but bad 
because the gain from deviation is also the highest.
^Note that by cooperation we refer to first-best investment and sharing rule. Of course even under 
noncooperation the agents get together and make the deal but the investment is lower and the division 
of surplus is different
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Proposition 2.3 tells that the gain and loss from deviation move to the same 
direction as we change jJi and it is not immediately clear what is the effect on 3^ . The 
change in 5 ^  is given by:
?NI
(2.19) ^  ,  ( l - U ) V ( / W 3 u
[V(/ ) - c (I  )] - [v(INI) - c (/" )]
__________ fv(/*) - v(/W)l
[(1+M)v(/W/) /2  - c ( /" ) ]  - [(1+M)v(/ )/2 - c(I )]
where = denotes that the expressions have the same sign. The sign of (2.19) depends 
on the difference between the relative changes in the gain and loss. If the relative 
decrease in the gain from deviation is higher than the relative decrease in the 
punishment then is decreasing in ijl. Analysing such a difference is very subtle. 
Therefore we introduce explicit functional forms for the value and cost of investment. 
First in Subsection 2.4.1 we examine a simple example of discrete investments. Then 
in Subsection 2.4.2 continuous investments with constant cost elasticity are analysed. 
Subsection 2.4.3 examines several other functional forms.
2.4.1 Discrete Investment
In this Subsection we examine discrete investments. We assume that:
Assumption 2.1'. I  can take three values: 0, v, and 2v.
Assumption 2.2'. c(0) = 0, c(v) = c, and c(2v) = yc where 2 < y < 3 .
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Assumption 2.2' ensures that 2v is the efficient level of investment. We further assume 
that v = 2c - e where e is very small. This assumption guarantees that zero investment 
will be chosen in the punishment path when agent 1 does not have an outside option 
related to investment. While for even a small outside option the medium investment, v, 
is chosen. This assumption allows us to concentrate on the most interesting part of the 
parameter space.
Under joint ownership zero investment will be chosen in the punishment path. 
This is ensured by:
(2.20) - c < 0  and
(2.21) v - yc < 0
Using equations (2.14) and (2.15) the gain and loss from deviation are:
(2.22) d °  = yc - v
(2.23) LJ0 = 2 v - y c
Therefore the lowerbound for the discount factor is:
(2.24) s ’0  = r  ~ v
From our earlier analysis we know that cross ownership and agent 2 control are 
equivalent to joint ownership.
Under nonintegration agent 1 will choose v in the punishment path for p  e (0,/T) 
where Ji = [2(y-l)c - v]/v < 1. Then it is true that:
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(2.25) }j(l+n)v - c > 0 and
(2.26) ^ 1  +ju)v - c > (1+ju)v - yc
The gain and loss from deviation are:
(2.27) ( f 1 = (y-l)c - (^1+M)v
(2.28) LNI = v - (^ l)c
And the lowerbound for the discount factor is:
Integration by agent 1 is equivalent to nonintegration when fx = A^ . 
Accordingly:
2(y-l)c - (1+A )v
(2.30) 8 = ------- ( | n -  2 -  for ^  £ (0.1,)
where J<2 = fi. In what follows we analyse the case when fx e (0,/T) and e (0,A2).12
It is easy to show that integration by agent 1 (weakly) dominates nonintegration 
(811 < 5^). The punishment is equal under both structures (Nash investment is equal to 
v) and the gain is lower under integration since then agent I's outside option is higher 
and agent 2 can extract a smaller share of the surplus in noncooperative bargaining.
12Since we already know that when fx = A^  = 0 all ownership structures are equivalent and when either 
H> IX or X2> first-best can be obtained even for 5=0.
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Because nonintegration is dominated we can determine the optimal ownership 
structure by comparing joint ownership and agent 1 control. From (2.24) and (2.30) it 
follows that:
iQ 7/ 2 ( Av+c)
(2.31) $  < 8  <=>
Therefore for large values of y  joint ownership (and cross ownership and agent 2 
control) are optimal and for small values of y  agent 1 control is optimal.13
How does y  affect the incentives to cooperate? It is easy to see from equations
(2.22) and (2.27) that the gain from deviation is increasing in y. When the first-best 
investment becomes more expensive (y increases) agent 2 has to pay a higher transfer 
to agent 1 to implement efficient investment. Since the value of the investment has not 
changed 2's payoff is now lower under cooperation. On the other hand 2's deviation 
payoff is unchanged because it is not related to the investment costs. Therefore the 
gain from deviation is higher. Equations (2.23) and (2.28) show that the loss from 
deviation is decreasing in y. The drop in surplus after deviation is smaller when the 
first-best investment is expensive and thus the first-best surplus is not very high.
The equivalent of equation (2.19) in this discrete case is:
13The critical value for y determined by equation (2.31) has to lie between 2 and 3 for both regions to 
exist Denote this critical value by y.
O') y > 2 <=> v > c
(//) y < 3 <=> 2A^ v < c( 1+3^)
Insert v = 2c in 00 and we have X^ < 1. Clearly this is true.
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(2.32) S70 < S11 <=> (GJ0-G1,)/G11 < (LJ0-LU)/LU
Accordingly joint ownership is optimal if  moving from agent 1 control to joint 
ownership increases the punishment relatively more than the gain from deviation. 
When y is high the gain is high and the punishment is low. Therefore it is easier to 
obtain a higher relative change in punishment. (The absolute changes do not in fact 
depend on y.) Then joint ownership which maximizes punishment is optimal. When y  
is low the opposite is true: the gain is low and the punishment is high. Then the 
optimal thing is to put all the weight in minimizing the gain since higher relative 
changes are easier to obtain there.
In the next subsection this result is confirmed for continuous investments.
2.4.2 Continuous Investment: Constant Elasticity
We assume that the value and the cost of investment are:
Assumption 2.1". v(I) = /.
Assumption 2.2". c(I) = f l  where y >  1.
Lemma 2.3 determines the sign for equation (2.19).
Lemma 2.3. 5 ^ is
decreasing  in 
independent o f  
increasing in
\i if  and only i f y
<
>
Proof: In Appendix 2.
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Lemmas 2.1 to 2.3 help us to construct Figure 2.1. We also include the 
implication of Proposition 2.2: (1) = 0. The Figure compares the lowerbounds for
the discount factor under different ownership structures for various values of the 
outside option parameters ju and A^ . This Figure proves to be very useful in examining 
the optimal ownership structure.
When costs are very elastic the punishment effect dominates14; a small increase 
in ju will lower the punishment more than the gain and cooperation becomes more 
difficult (5 ^  increases). While when costs are quite inelastic the gain effect is more 
important; a higher \i will lower the gain more than the punishment and cooperation is 
easier decreases). This is in line with the results of the previous subsection. For 
high values of y  moving from joint ownership (ji = 0) to agent 1 control (ji > 0) 
weakens the incentives to cooperate while for low values of y  the incentives are 
improved by this change in the ownership structure.
The result is the same for both discrete and continuous investment but the 
effects behind the continuous case are more complex. In the discrete case the levels of 
the first-best and Nash investment are fixed and only the cost of the first-best 
investment changes in y. For high values of y the gain from deviation is high and the 
punishment is low. Since the absolute changes do not depend on y  moving from joint 
ownership to agent 1 control will result in a higher relative decrease in the punishment 
than in the gain; 8  increases. In the continuous case the levels of investment are not 
fixed but adjust to changes in the cost elasticity. When the costs become more elastic 
the gap between the efficient and the noncooperative investment becomes smaller.
14The important parameter is the elasticity of investment costs relative to the elasticity of the value of 
investment We have assumed, without loss of generality, that the value is unit elastic and therefore 
our condition depends only on the cost elasticity, y.
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Figure 2.1(a)
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y <  2
Figure 2.1(b)
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Now the important effects are the absolute changes in the gain and loss due to higher 
ju. We rewrite these changes from equations (2.17) and (2.18).
(2.33)
(2.34)
dG
cfjl
dL
(Jjl
NI
Both these terms describe the change in investment due to higher slope of the value 
function. In the first one the slope changes from ^(1 +/x) to 1 and in the second one the 
slope increases a little from ^(1 +p). It is obvious that the faster the slope of the cost 
function increases the smaller will be the induced changes in the investments due to 
steeper value function. Furthermore the change in gain is more sensitive to y than the 
change in punishment. In (2.33) the change in the slope of the value function (and 
accordingly the change in the investment) is not marginal and a change in y  will have a 
greater effect. Because the changes in the gain and punishment are both decreasing in 
y and the gain is decreasing faster, for high values of y the change in punishment is 
higher and therefore also the relative change in punishment is greater. Accordingly, for 
high y the punishment effect dominates (5^7 is increasing in fj) and for low y the gain 
effect dominates (5 ^  is decreasing in ju).15 This leads to our main results.
Proposition 2.4. Joint ownership, integration by the noninvesting agent 2 and cross 
ownership are (weakly) optimal if and only if  y >  2, p  < 1 and X2 < 1.
15It is also true that now the level of punishment is greater than the level of gain for high values of y. 
But the absolute change in punishment is so much greater than in the gain that also the relative 
change in punishment is greater.
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Proof:
It is immediately clear from Figure 2.1(a) that for y  > 2 ? f0 = 52/ < <5  ^ and
when (i < 1 and X2 < 1.
Q.E.D.
When y > 2 it becomes important to ensure that the punishment is maximal. 
Then joint ownership is optimal. The agents have to reach a unanimous agreement to 
use the assets. If not they can work for another firm at zero wage. Therefore the joint 
surplus is the lowest possible in the punishment path and cheating would lead to a very 
bad equilibrium. Reputation effects thus provide a new explanation for partnerships.
Agent 2 control is equally good in providing maximal punishment. Removing 
all the control rights from the only investing agent is a hostage type solution to prevent 
opportunism as discussed in Williamson (1983) and (1985). Under agent 2 control I's 
outside option is to work for another firm at zero wage. Therefore the punishment is 
the highest. Franchising gives an example of hostages: franchisors sometimes control 
the leases of franchisees or even own the land on which their outlet is located to ensure 
proper quality standards and after-sales services.16
Also cross ownership is equivalent to the above structures in our model. 
However, if  agent I's investment is not fully specific to asset but is somewhat useful 
also for working with asset a2 cross ownership does not guarantee maximal 
punishment. Then if 1 owns a2 she has an outside option related to her investment 
while joint ownership and agent 2 control remove I's outside option; cross ownership is 
not optimal.
16Klein (1980), 359.
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Proposition 2.5. Integration by the only investing agent is (weakly) optimal if y <  2. 
Proof:
Now Figure 2.1 (b) where y <  2 is appropriate. Since by assumption X2 > /I, t f 1 is the 
lowest as the Figure illustrates.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.5 tells that when y  < 2, the prediction of the one-shot game holds. 
In this parameter range it is more important to ensure that the gain from deviation is 
the smallest possible although then also punishment is minimal. This will be 
guaranteed by giving the ownership of both assets to the investing agent 1.
Proposition 2.6. Ownership does not matter if  (i) p  = X2 -  0 or (ii) y  = 2, p  < 1 and 
\ 2 < i .
Proof:
(0 Follows straightforward from Lemma 2.2. (ii) If y  = 2 8  is equal for all ownership 
structures as Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 show (if p  < 1 and X2 < 1).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.6 gives the only two cases when ownership structure does not 
matter. First, if all ownership structures are equivalent in the static game (equal Nash 
investment) they will be equivalent in the dynamic game as well. Second, even when 
the ownership structures differ in the one-shot game we have the knife-edge result 
when the punishment and gain effect exactly offset each other and ownership does not 
matter.
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2.4.3 Other Functional Forms
In this Subsection we report the results of experiments with other functional 
forms. The following alternatives were examined:
(a) v(ft = c(ft = ( / -  1), a  > 2y
(b) v(ft = a/, c(7) = (e^- 1), a  > 2y
(c) v(ft = odn(/), c(J) = (/r- 1), a  > 2y
(d) v(l) = (a  + p l - 8 l \  c(T) = %  J3>2y
(e) v(r> = (a  + p i -  6 l \  c(ft = /
(ft v(ft = (a + /)2/46, c(7) = c/2, c > 1/46
For (a) to (e) £  is increasing in and joint ownership, agent 2 control and 
cross ownership are optimal. While for (ft 5  is decreasing in /t and agent 1 control 
gives the best incentives to cooperate. These examples show that we should be 
somewhat cautious about the results of the previous two subsections. It is not only the 
convexity/elasticity of the cost function that drives the results. For (a) to (d) 
depends only on fi, other parameters cancel out. For (e) 8 ^  depends also on 0 and y  
but whatever the value of these parameters f?*1 is increasing in jj,. Likewise for (f)
depends on b and c as well. What is common between these results and the constant
elasticity ones is that when fF1 is increasing in fi both the level of punishment and the 
change in punishment due to higher fx are greater than the level of and the change in 
gain. Whereas when is decreasing in fi the opposite is true: the level of and the 
change in gain are greater.
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2.5 Two Investments
We chose a very simple structure for our model to make the main trade-off in 
the repeated game clear. In this Section we analyse the first natural extension: both 
agents have an investment. We denote agent I's and 2's investment by I 1 and I2 
respectively and assume that the value of the investment is v(7.) = I. and the cost of 
investment is c.(I.) = lV<J. where y  > 1 and cr. > 0.r i i i  1 i
In this setup both agents can cheat and punish by investment and the optimal 
sharing rule is not as simple as in the main model. Proposition 2.7 designs a sharing 
rule such that both agents have best incentives to cooperate.
Proposition 2.7. The optimal sharing rule is:
Proof:
When agent i pays a transfer T to agent j  for the input or for the contribution of the 
worker, the payoffs are:
p )  = sP* + (I - s)(S* - Pd2)
P*2 = ( l  - s)Pd2 + s(S* - P^) 
where s = (P^ - Pp/(P* + P* - P? - P?) and S* =
(2.35) P i =v ( I I) + v(I2) - T - c . ( I . )
(2.36)
Then agent i will cooperate if and only if:
(2.37)
P “ - v(I ) - v(7 ) + T + c i l  ) 
i  ^ i i
pd _ pP
- v« 2 )
Likewise agent j  cooperates if and only if:
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d *r .  - T +  c { i . )
(2.38) 8 > — 3------- ]- J —
P d  _ p P
j  j
Because agent i's incentive to cooperate is decreasing in T while f s  incentive is
*
increasing in T, the optimal T gives the agents balanced incentives to cooperate.
Setting the right-hand-sides of equations (2.37) and (2.38) equal we can solve for T :
* (Pdr P’’)[P di+ c ( I * ) ]  + (Pd-PpM V(I*)+v(I*)-Pd-c(I*)]
(2 39) T = J J J________ J J 1____ * i i i
( Pf f*)  + (FfPfy
*
Inserting T in equations (2.35) and (2.36) gives the expressions in the Proposition.
Q.E.D.
Neither agent would have an incentive to deviate if they could get their
deviation payoff even under cooperation. Since this is not feasible the best we can do
is to give each agent a certain proportion of her deviation payoff. It is like agent 1 gets
her deviation payoff with probability s and agent 2 gets his deviation payoff with
* dprobability (1 - s) leaving the rest of the surplus, (S - P p , to agent 1. s is chosen to
balance the agent's incentives to cooperate. Proposition 2.7 gives s =
(P^-P^/iP^+P^-pP-P^). This weight is related to how close the Nash investment is to 
the first-best one. For example under nonintegration:
(2.40) (Pd2-Pp2) -  £(1 -tl) [v(/*) - v < ) ] .
If agent 1 is better able to punish agent 2 by investment
(2.41) [v(/*) - v ( f ‘)} > [v(/*) - v ( ^ ) ]
then s > 1/2 and agent 1 receives a higher proportion of her deviation payoff than agent
2.
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Sometimes agent 1 does not have an incentive to deviate in investment: she has 
first-best incentives even in the one-shot game (she owns both assets and agent 2 is
j
dispensable). Then P2 = Pp and s = 0, that is agent 2 gets his full deviation payoff. 
This is the same case as we had in our main model; the noninvesting agent could 
punish only by sharing rule and therefore the investing agent got her full deviation 
payoff which is equal to her punishment payoff in this case. Here agent I's Nash 
investment is equal to its efficient level and therefore reversion to noncooperation 
provides no punishment in investment.
Inserting the optimal sharing rule of Proposition 2.7 in (2.37) or (2.38) gives us 
a lowerbound for the discount factor:
(2.42) 8  = (G1 + G2)/(Gj + G 2 + L 1 + )
where G.  is the gain from deviation to agent i and L. is the loss. Now the best 
ownership structure is such that the aggregate gain from deviation is lowest relative to 
the aggregate punishment. Since we have equalized the incentives it is the aggregate 
terms that matter.
The same trade-off is present in this version of the model: an ownership 
structure that provides maximal punishment will also give the highest gain from 
deviation.17
17See Proposition A2.1 in Appendix 2.
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Now when both agents have an investment obviously agent 2 control is not 
anymore equivalent to joint ownership and cross ownership; under integration by 2 an 
investing agent has control rights. The second difference to our main model is that 
nonintegration and integration by agent i are not equivalent when worker j  is 
indispensable (A. = fi). Although i's investment is equal under both structures f s  
investment will differ and therefore 8 is not equal. Lemma 2.4 gives some useful 
properties for the lowerbounds of the discount factor.
Lemma 2.4.
(i) d<f'ldn = (7 - 2).
(ii) -  8 l ( X f l  = ( 7 - 2 )  fo r  0 < n =  X .  <  1.
(iii) [ Z f ' f X . )  -  S'0] = ( y - 2 )  fo r 0 <  X  <  1.
(iv) f}l(0) = S'(l).
Proof: In Appendix 2.
Lemma 2.4 helps us to construct Figure 2.2 which we use to find the optimal
ownership structure. The results are in line with our main model.
Proposition 2.8. When both agents have an investment joint ownership and cross 
ownership are (weakly) optimal if and only i f y > 2  and p  < 1.
Proof:
See Figure 2.2(a) where y  > 2. It is immediately clear from the Figure that <
i "  and S/0 = f °  < 8 '  when ) i<  1.
Q.E.D.
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y >  2
Figure 2.2(a)
y<  2
Figure 2.2(b)
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As in the main model maximizing punishment becomes important when costs 
are very elastic and joint ownership and cross ownership are optimal. The same remark 
given in the previous section applies also here: cross ownership would not be optimal if 
i's investment is not fully specific to a. and therefore partnership is the more general 
prediction.
Proposition 2.9. The following statements are true if y <  2:
(i) Joint and cross ownership are (weakly) dominated by nonintegration and 
integration.
(ii) I f  assets are strictly complementary then nonintegration is (weakly) dominated by 
integration.
(iii) I f  agent i is indispensable to asset a., then integration by agent j  is (weakly) 
dominated by nonintegration.
Proof:
See Figure 2.2(b) where y < 2. (i) Under joint ownership and cross ownership 8 
reaches its maximum. Therefore these structures are dominated, (ii) When assets are 
strictly complementary (p  = 0), the value for 5 ^  is given by the intercept in the 
vertical axis. Therefore > tf1. (iii) When agent j  is indispensable to asset a., X. = 
p.  The Figure shows that then 5 ^  < S 1. Q.E.D.
As in the main model a control structure that minimizes the gain from deviation 
is best when y <  2. Proposition 2.9 gives the same results as Hart and Moore (1990). 
One important determinant for the optimal ownership structure is the degree of 
complementarity between the assets; when the assets are strictly complementary they 
should be owned together. Also, if an agent is very important as a trading partner
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(indispensable) then he should own his asset. Furthermore, joint and cross ownership 
are dominated.
In Proposition 2.9 we considered only extreme values of the parameters \i and 
X.. It is interesting to examine if the static and repeated game give exactly the same 
predictions for all parameter values. For this aim we have constructed Figures 2.3 and 
2.4. The Figures are based on numerical simulations of the model. In Figure 2.3 the 
relative importance of the investment is in the vertical axis (when > 1 agent l's 
investment is more important) and the degree of asset complementarity is in the 
horizontal axis.18 The predictions for the limit values of parameter (X are the same: 
strictly complementary assets should be owned together and for economically 
independent assets there should be independent control. However, for intermediate 
values of ji  there are some differences and in particular nonintegration is more likely in 
the repeated game. Figure 2.3 also shows that the more important an agent's 
investment is the more likely it is that she owns both assets.
In Figure 2.4 we have the importance of an agent as a trading partner in the 
horizontal axis. Here we assume for simplicity that X = Xj = X2. X has a peculiar 
nonmonotonic effect; although in general in this parameter range it is more important 
to minimize the gain from deviation the punishment effect starts to dominate under 
integration for high values of X. When a worker is almost dispensable if she becomes 
even more dispensable the punishment decreases more than the gain under integration 
and it is better to give her the ownership of her asset. Therefore in this setup both a 
fully indispensable and fully dispensable agent should own her asset while only the 
former is true in the one-shot game. However, this nonmonotonic effect is not very
18The Figure is drawn for given value of X, where 0 < X < 1.
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1
Figure 2.3
dynamic
static
1
Figure 2.4
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robust since it did not occur in our main model. Also Figure 2.4 shows that 
nonintegration is more likely in the repeated game. This observation can be linked to 
the discussion about integration and reputation being substitutes (e.g. Klein (1980) and 
Coase (1988)). This discussion refers to models where the benefit of integration is 
reduced holdups and costs are something else (like arising from bureaucracy). There 
clearly one would expect less integration in a repeated setting; the benefits of 
integration are lower and costs have not changed. In our model both the benefits and 
costs of integration change in the repeated game and it is not a priori clear which way 
the reputation effect goes. As Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show nonintegration is more likely 
when y <  2 . 1 9
!9of course when y > 2 nonintegration is less likely in the repeated setting. In fact, nonintegration 
never occurs.
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Appendix 2
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
The joint surplus maximizing investment is:
- 1
(A2.1) I  = ■/r' 1)
and the Nash investment under nonintegration is:
1
(A2.2) 7W = [(l+/i)/2y]<r' 1)
Inserting these investments in (2.14) and (2.15) we obtain:
(A2.3) GW = / r' 1 , j^ l -
(A2.4) LNI = ^ [ l  - [ 1 ^ ] ^ ]  - / ^ > [ l  -
Therefore the lowerbound for the discount factor under nonintegration is:
(a m
¥ M ‘ '
Differentiating (A2.5) with respect to fi we obtain:
da?' y - -  . a
<A2-6> w ~ L I1 { ¥ F \ { W - (^ ]r-1[frD- g $ ]}  -
r[t - [ ^ ^ { ( r - D  - (1^ ] r‘1[(7-i) - (i -m)/2] }
To simplify notation define £ = (y - 2) > -1 and 7] = (l+jii)/2. Since 0 < fi < 1, then 1/2
< 7] < 1. Then (A2.6) simplifies to:
2+e 1
(A2.7) F n(e) = [ l  -I7 1+e ] { ( 1 +e) - J?1 +£[(l+e) - J -
1 J _
(2+e) 1^ |( l+ e )  - T)1+e[(l+e) - (l-r j)] |
1 j . c
Next define v s  77 . Substituting v in (A2.7) and simplifying we obtain:
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(A2.8)FfJ(e) = (1 -vr])[(l+e)(l-v) + v(l-rj)/rj] - (2+e)(l -v )[(l+ e)(l-v ) + v(l-rj)]
= (l-v7])(v-rj)/rj - e(2+e)(l-v ) 2
From Vs definition we have e = { [ln(T])/ln(v)] - 1}. Substituting this in (A2.8) gives:
(A2.9) F J e)  = ( l - v n X y - m  - { [In(rj)/ln(v) ] 2  - l } ( l -v ) 2
= (v(l-tj)2- J7(l-v)2[ln(Tj)/ln(v)]2}/J?
= ( l - r 7)2 ( l-v )2 [/.(v)/(T ?)] 
rj[ln(v ) ] 2
2
where f{v )  = v ftn(v)] . Lemma 2.3 says that F (e) = e. It is easy to verify from
(1-v) 11
(A2.9) that F (0) = 0. Furthermore F^(e) = [/(v) - / ( 77)]. It is straightforward to show 
that:
- l < e < 0  <=> 0 < v < r j < l  
e  = 0  <=> 1 / 2  < v = 77 < 1 
e > 0  <=> 1 / 2  <, rj < v < 1  
Therefore / ' (v )  > 0 for v e (0,1) implies that F (e) = e.
(A2 .1 0 ) /  '(v) = ( l± vl L ln-(v)] 2+ 21n( y) = g(v)h(v)
( 1 -v ) 3  ( 1 -v ) 2
where g(v) = [2 (l-v)/(l+ v) + ln(v)] and h(v) = (l+v)ln(v)/(l-v)3. h(v) < 0  for v e
(0 ,1 ). g (l) = 0  and g'(v) = (l-v)2 /v (l+ v ) 2  > 0  and therefore g(v) < 0  for v e (0 , 1 ).
Accordingly / ' (v )  = h(v)g(v) > 0 for v e (0,1).
Q.E.D.
d d *Proposition A2.1. Both the aggregate gain from deviation, (Pj+P^-S ), and the 
aggregate loss, (S -P^-P?), are decreasing in \i under nonintegration and decreasing in 
X. under integration.
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Proof:
♦
First note that S does not depend on fx or A* Agent i's punishment payoff under 
nonintegration is:
(A 2 .ll)  Pp. = ^ v ( / f )  + - c .ff .1)
Total differentiation gives:
dINI
(A2.12) dPp./dll = - v ( f .1)] + > 0
Consequently the aggregate punishment is decreasing in fx:
dINI dINI
(A2.13) d(S*-Pp-Pp)/dn  = -  U f l  [ v ' ( / f + v'(/2) ^  ] < 0
Agent i's deviation payoff is:
(A2.14) Pd. = ^ v ( / f ) + Q f r , * )  - c .( f / )
By differentiating totally we obtain:
(A2.15) d p f a  = v(I*.)] > 0
(A2.16) d(Pd+Pd- S * m  = + < )  - v(7*j - v(/*J] < 0
Repeating the analysis for the integrated structure gives:
* (l-A .) , . d l a
(A2.17) d(S -Ppf PP2m .  = ------ jJ -  v '(/f)g^  < 0
j
(A2.18) d(Pd+Pd-S*)/dX. = \y(f.) - v(I*)]/2 < 0
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
( 0  ^ ( 0 ) = 5^(1)
The first-best and Nash investments are:
1
(A2.19) / .  = (cr/tfl<r' 1)
1
(A2.20) / v = [(l+A/)<7 y2 y](r' 1)
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1
(A2.21)
Using these equations we obtain the lowerbound for the discount factor under agent i 
control:
(A2.22)
JL
7-1
1
7-1
1
7-1
We simplify notation by defining 77 = (l+A^/2, c. = o ^ ’ 1^  and e = (7 - 2).
[1 - ^
2+e
1 +e
77c .(2 +e)(A2.23) tf'(A.) = (c. [ l  - + c. [ l  - [j]
h 2+ e)[l  • ^  +2<2+£)c,[i - [y1^ }
Next define v = 7]1^ 1+^  and (p = 2"1^ 1+e^)
(A2.24) f } \X )  = [(l-rjv)c. + (l-<p/2)c. - (2 +e)(l-v)7)c. -
(2 +e)( 1  - (p)cjl] /  [ ( 1  -77) (2 +e) ( 1  - v)c. + (2 +e)(l-(p)c//2 ]
For X. = 0: rj = 1/2 and v  = (p and for X. = 1: 77 = 1  and v = 1. Substituting these into 
(A2.24) we obtain:
(A2.25) tf7 (0) = [ ( 1  -<p/2)(c +c ) - (2 +e)(l-ip)(c +c ) / 2  ]/[(2+e)(l-<p)(c.+c.)/2]
* y 1 j  1 j
= [( 1 - 9 / 2 ) - (2 +e)(l-<p) / 2  ] / [ ( 2 +e)(l-9 )/2 ]
(A2.26) S ^ l)  = [(l-«p/2)c - (2+e)(l-«p)c/2]/[(2+e)(l-<p)c//2]
= [( 1 - 9 / 2 ) - (2 +e)(l-9 )/2 ] / [ ( 2 +e)(l-(p)/2 ]
Therefore tf'fO) = 8 l(l).
(ii) i f ’(n) - 8'(X) = e for 0 < = A. < 1 and ti’i l )  - t f °  = e forO<A <1.
The Nash investments under nonintegration are:
(A2.27) f f  = [ ( 1  +/i)trj/ 2 7 ] (r' 1)
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Substituting these into (2.42) we obtain (A2.5); the lowerbound for nonintegration is 
equal when one or both agents have an investment. Since at fJL =  X. 77 = rj and v = v we 
obtain:
(A2.28) < f V )  - 8 '{X )  =
(1-tjv) - J)(2+e)(l-v) (1-rj v)c. +(1 -<p/2)c.-T)(2+e)(1-v)c .-(2+e)(l-<p)c12 
(l-fj)(2+e)(l-v) (l-t])(2+e)(l-v)c.+(2+e)(l-<p)c./2
= (l-J?v)(l-<p) - 2 ( l - 7j)(l-v)(l-<p/2 ) + (l-2Jj)(2+e)(l-v)(l-<p)
Note that o '  is not defined at /J =  1.
Under joint ownership the Nash investments are:
1
(A2.29) = (oY2 tf(r‘ 1)
And we have:
(A2.30) - a7 0  =
( 1  -rjv)c . + ( 1  - (p/2 ) c .-rj(2 + e) ( 1 -v)c .■- (2 +e)( 1  -(p)cjl
( 1  - H) (2 + e ) ( l - v )c .+ (  2 +e) ( l-(p)c.l 2 
(l-<p/2 ) - (2 +e) ( l-(p) / 2  ^
 (2 +e) ( l-<p) / 2 -------- =
(l-rjv)(l-<p) - 2 (l-rj)(l-v)(l-<p/2 )+ ( l - 2 rj)(2 +e)(l-v)(l-<p)
This proves that 8^!(p ) - = 5^(A.) - <8 *° for fx = A- Therefore one of the
following has to be true:
( 0  5 % )  < s ' a . )  < a7 0
(ii) f ( j j )  = g '(X ) = ^ 0
(iii) a^ ot) > afyu > a70
From Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we know that a^ 77(0) = a 777 and da777/d)l = e. Therefore for 
H = X. = 0 and/or e  = 0 a777 = 8 7 0  and (ft) holds. For fi = X. e (0,1) and e < 0 a 7^ 7  < 8 7 0  
and therefore (/) holds. Respectively for ji = X. e  (0,1) and e > 0 a777 > a7  and (iii) 
holds.
Q.E.D.
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3 Vertical Supply, Foreclosure and Overbuying
3.1 Introduction
This Chapter focuses on vertical oligopolies when both integrated and 
unintegrated firms coexist. Our main interest is in an integrated firm's decision about 
which market to enter, and at what scale to operate. The integrated firm realizes that 
its actions in the input market affect the competition in the final good market. 
Although the integrated firm can obtain input at marginal cost from its own upstream 
unit, it may prefer to buy some in the market aiming to raise input price for the rival; 
that is, the integrated firm might overbuy. In some other circumstances the integrated 
firm might vertically supply its rival. But the input it sells to its rival will ultimately 
compete with its own final good. Therefore the integrated firm might not be willing to 
sell (or buy) input: that is, it might choose to foreclose in the upstream market. Also, if 
the integrated firm is very inefficient in the downstream market, it may be optimal to 
exit and operate only in the upstream market. In this Chapter we derive conditions for 
the integrated firm to overbuy, foreclose, vertically supply its rival or exit from the 
downstream market. In addition, we look at how the firm's optimal product mix will 
adjust to changes in costs and demand.
The integrated firm may choose to buy input in the market although internal 
supplies would be cheaper. Overbuying drives up rival's marginal cost and the 
integrated firm is in a better competitive position in the final good market. (In our 
model input is produced with constant returns to scale and therefore the integrated firm 
cannot completely monopolize the downstream market by buying up the input.) This 
of course comes at a cost; the average (but not the marginal) cost of the integrated firm 
increases. If the gain in the downstream market is greater than the increased cost of
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input, the integrated firm will find it optimal to buy input. Overbuying arises in 
equilibrium for example when the integrated firm is more or equally efficient in 
transforming input into the final good than its unintegrated rival. If it is already in a 
strong position in the downstream market it can afford to raise average costs somewhat 
in order to gain an even stronger competitive position.
The integrated firm understands that every unit of input it sells to its rival will 
increase the rival's downstream production and, consequently, decrease the price for its 
own final good. If this strategic effect on downstream profit is great enough, the 
integrated firm will not sell input. We show that it is not always optimal for the 
integrated firm to foreclose, even when, for instance, it has access to the same 
technology (for producing the final good) as the unintegrated firm to which it is selling. 
The crucial issue is the integrated firm's relative overall efficiency in transforming the 
input into final good. If the integrated firm is more efficient than the unintegrated firm, 
it is indeed not optimal to sell input. But if the integrated firm is less efficient, it may 
be profitable. If the integrated firm is in any case in a weak position in the 
downstream market, it may well sell some input and at least make a profit from it. In 
an international trade setting where the unintegrated downstream firm is in the 
domestic country and the integrated firm is an exporter, vertical supply can be an 
equilibrium as a result of differences in other factor costs, for example labour costs. 
Also, if the transportation cost is higher for the final good than for the input, the 
integrated firm may sell input. Furthermore, the domestic country can induce supply of 
input by imposing a greater tariff on the final good than on the input.
In our main model foreclosure is a knife-edge. Everywhere else except in one 
point the integrated firm is active in the input market: it either sells or buys input. In 
our application to international trade transportation costs paid by the seller introduce a
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wedge between overbuying and vertical supply regions where foreclosure is an 
equilibrium.
When the integrated firm chooses its strategy in the input market there is a 
trade-off between gains in the final market and losses in the input market. The exit 
decision is simpler: it only depends on the profit margin of the final good. When the 
integrated firm is very inefficient in transforming input into the final good, it will find 
it optimal to exit and operate only in the upstream market.
Above we have focused on the cost asymmetries as a driving force behind the 
integrated firm's strategy in the input market. Also the toughness of competition in the 
final good market affects the integrated firm's strategy. If there is no competition (the 
firms operate in different markets) input sales bring revenues to the integrated firm and 
it has no harmful effects whatsoever on its downstream profit; therefore vertical supply 
occurs. When competition is tough it becomes important for the integrated firm not to 
help its rival to compete against itself; vertical supply is not optimal. If the firms are 
equally efficient the integrated firm can achieve a cost advantage by overbuying input. 
This gives it a dominant position in a highly competitive market; overbuying emerges 
in equilibrium.
The integrated firm's decisions can also be affected by purely technological 
reasons. Vertical supply can arise when there are diminishing returns to scale in final 
good production (Quirmbach (1986)) while diminishing returns in input production may 
cause the integrated firm to buy input. Our model assumes constant marginal costs, so 
these effects are not present. Salinger (1988) examines the impact of a vertical merger 
on the input and final good price in an oligopoly where integrated and unintegrated 
firms coexist. He finds that the prices do not necessarily increase after a vertical
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merger and foreclosure. We show that overbuying would arise in his model, a strategy 
he did not consider. Therefore there is more tendency for the input and final good 
prices to increase than his results indicate. Spencer and Jones (1991) and (1992) 
examine vertical supply and foreclosure decisions in an international trade setting. 2 0  
Their models differ from ours in that the alternative supplier of input is a domestic 
perfectly competitive industry with high and increasing costs and we have an 
unintegrated oligopolist. Their main concern is the effect of domestic supply 
conditions (the absolute quantity of input supplies and the response of these supplies to 
the input price charged by the integrated firm) on the vertical supply decision. In our 
model the downstream costs rather than the upstream conditions are the crucial issue 
for the integrated firm's strategy. Also, Spencer and Jones do not consider the 
possibility that the integrated firm may buy input from the independent supplier to 
drive up its rival's costs or even monopolize the downstream market. Ordover, Saloner 
and Salop (1990) differs from the two previous papers (and from ours) in that they have 
Bertrand competition in the input market. In their model the integrated firm will 
foreclose in the upstream market but only because they assume that the integrated firm 
can commit not to supply rival firm below a certain price. They do not explain why 
such a commitment is feasible and why the firms have to integrate to make this 
commitment. In our model foreclosure can arise in equilibrium without incredible 
commitments. Lastly, Salop and Scheffman (1983) and (1987) analyse cost-raising 
strategies (including overbuying) of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe. In our 
model also the "fringe" behaves strategically.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce our
20The first draft of this Chapter was completed in December 1990, before the papers by Spencer and 
Jones came to our knowledge.
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model of vertical oligopolies. In Section 3.3 we derive the equilibrium of the two stage 
game. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 examine the integrated firm's strategies in the input and 
final good markets. Section 3.6 discusses the comparative statics of the model. In 
Section 3.7 the role of the toughness of competition in the downstream market is 
analysed. Section 3.8 applies our model to an international trade setting.
3.2 The Model
We consider a successive Cournot duopoly. There is a final good, y, and an 
input, jc, which are homogeneous. We include in the model a vertically integrated firm 
/ ,  an unintegrated upstream firm U, and an unintegrated downstream firm D. Our paper 
focuses on the integrated firm's decision about which market to enter, and at what scale 
to operate. Firm I  potentially sells input to D, buys input from U or provides its own 
input as Figure 3.1 illustrates. We denote by yD and y{ the final-good production levels 
of firms D  and /, and by xu  and Xj the amount of input firms U  and I  sell in the 
upstream market (if x{ is negative I  is buying input).
I N P U T
M A R K E T F I N A L  G O O D S  
M A R K E T
Figure 3.1
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In the first stage the upstream firms commit to input sales, and I  potentially 
purchases some input The buyers of input are assumed to be price takers in the 
upstream market. Price taking in just the extreme case where the upstream firms have 
all the bargaining power. Our results would not change if  the bargaining power were 
more equally distributed. The crucial assumption is that pricing is linear. Linear prices 
are justified when the downstream firms could bootleg. In the second stage, D  and I  
choose the downstream outputs given the input price. (The equilibrium in this 
downstream market generates the derived demand curve for the input by firm D  at the 
first stage.) Firm I  produces the input for its own use to order. The sequential 
decision-timing structure makes intuitive sense, because transportation takes time and 
the input must be available to downstream firms before they can manufacture the final 
good.
We make the following assumptions about the demand function and technology.
Assumption 3.1. The demand function for final good is p^ = a - b(yI + yD), where is 
the price o f the final good and a and b are positive constants.
Assumption 3.2. Firms have constant returns to scale in the production o f input and 
final good. The final good is produced with a fixed coefficient technology and a unit 
coefficient fo r  the input x.
The profit functions of the firms are:
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(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
*U = Xl / px ' 
nD = yD(Py - Px - f y '  and 
* / = Xf t x  - Cx> + y /P y  - Cx - V
where p  is the price of the input, c is C/'s marginal cost of input, c is D's marginal
cost of transforming input into final good (that is, the net marginal cost of the final
Note that I*s profit function is the same whether it buys or sells input. When it buys 
input (Xj < 0 ), it produces the remaining input requirements, (jyhxp, internally: 7i[ =
We further make the following assumption about the size of the downstream
market
Assumption 3.3. The downstream market is large enough to accommodate all three 
firms. Specifically, a is sufficiently large that the following two inequalities are 
satisfied:
good), c is Ts marginal cost of input, and c is Ts net marginal cost of the final good. x y
Xp x ’ ^ i+x? Cx + y/P y  ' Cy)J after rearranging the terms gives equation (3.3).
(0 a > c / 5  + 2c11 + 4 cD / 5 ;  andy x y
(ii) a > 13c 117 + 7(c + cU)/3 + 4 c °  .y x x' y
3.3 Equilibrium
To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we work backwards and solve 
first for the equilibrium in the downstream market given the input price p^. It is well 
known that the equilibrium quantities are:
66
(3.4) yD = [a + cx + cy - 2(cy + p j] /3 b ;  and
(3.5) y[ =  [a - 2(cx + < y +  cPy + p J /3 6 .
And the equilibrium price is:
(3.6) py = (a + cx + cy + cDy + pJI3.
Substituting the upstream market clearing condition
(3.7) yD = (Xj + Xy)
into (3.4) we can solve for the inverse demand for input; this gives the price at which D 
is willing to buy the input quantity supplied:
(3.8) px = [a + cx + cy - 2<Py - 3b(xJ + xv )]/2.
Next we turn to examine the first stage. Inserting p  from (3.8) into (3.1) we 
get firm Ifs  profit expressed in terms of and only:
(3.9) k tt = x T1{ [a + c + c - 2(P - 3b(xr + xTT) 1 / 2  - cU}.y U U'-L x y y ' /  U/J xJ
We can do the same for firm I. First substitute p  from (3.6) and y7  from (3.5) into 
(3.3). Then substitute px from (3.8) and we obtain firm I’s profit in terms of xf and x^  
only:
(3.10)
2
*, = [a ■ cx - c - b(x} + x v f\ 14b + 
x,{  [a + cx + cy ■ 2c°y - 3b(x/  + xv )]/2 - c^}.
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The first order conditions for firm ITs and firm Ts equilibrium choice of outputs and 
Xj are:
(3.11) diiyldXy = a + cx + c - 2cy  - 2c x - 3bXj- 6bx^ = 0; and
(3.12) dnjdXj = - [a - cx - +
(a - c + c - 2(P - 3bxTT - b&cJ = 0.
' x  y y U I '
Firm I  is aware that higher input sales or lower input purchases will decrease its 
downstream profits (the first big term in (3.12), in square brackets), because the final- 
good price decreases. The equilibrium quantities in the upstream market are thus:
(3.13) x TJ = (5a + 5c - c - 10cU - 4cD)/24b; and
/  C/ ' x  y x  y
(3.14) x, = ( - a - c  + 5 c + 2cU-4 c D)/12b.'  I  ' x  y x  v 7
(Notice that, thanks to Assumption 3.3, the right-hand side of (3.13) is positive, so that 
firm U does not drop out of the upstream market.) The equilibrium price is:
(3.15) p  =<5a + 5c - c  + 6cU- 4 cD)I16.^ x  ' x  y x  y
Finally, we can return back to the downstream market to ascertain the subgame 
perfect equilibrium in terms of the exogenous parameters only. When we insert (3.15) 
into (3.4) and (3.5) we get the equilibrium quantities:
(3.16)
(3.17)
y_ = (a + c + 3c - 2cU- 4cD)/8b; and J D  ' x  y x  y
y, = (7a - 9c - 11c  + 2cU+ 4cD)ll6b.' I  ' x  y x  y '
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(Notice that, again thanks to Assumption 3.3, the right-hand-side of (3.16) is positive, 
so that firm D  will not exit from the downstream market.) By substituting (3.15) into
(3.6) we obtain the equilibrium price:
(3.18) p  =  (7a + 7c + 5c + 2cU+ 4cD)!16.
y  x  y  x  y
Lastly, suppose that foreclosure is an equilibrium (the integrated firm neither 
sells or buys input). It is a simple matter to repeat the earlier analysis with xJ set equal
to zero. The subgame perfect equilibrium quantity and price in the upstream market
are:
(3.19) x .. = (a + c + c - 2cU - 2c°)/6b; and
u  v  y  X  X  y
(3.20) px = (a + c + cx + 2cux - 2<Py)!4
where the hats denote the foreclosure equilibrium. The equilibrium quantities in the 
downstream market are:
(3.21) y n = (a + c + c  - 2cU - 2c°)/6b; and
V /  v  y  X  X  y
(3.22) y  =  (5a - 1c -7 c  + 2cU +  2cD)/l2b.
\  /  j j  \  y  x  x  y '
And the equilibrium price is:
(3.23) p  = (5 a  + 5c + 5 c  + 2 c U + 2cD)/12.y y x x y'
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3.4 Input Market
In this Section we examine firm I's strategy in the input market. I's strategy 
depends crucially on its downstream net marginal costs. It is useful to define the 
critical value C for to be that which makes the right-hand-side of (3.14) equal to 
zero:
(3.24) C = (a + cx - 2 c ^  + 4 cD)I5.
Proposition 3.1 follows straightforward from (3.14).
Proposition 3.1. The integrated firm will
(i) buy input if  and only if  < C,
(ii) foreclose if  and only if c  ^= C and
(iii) sell input to its rival if  and only if  cy > C.
The critical value C gives the point at which I  will switch from overbuying to 
supplying input. It follows from Assumption 3.3 that C > 0.
When the integrated firm is very efficient in final good production it will 
overbuy. Because input is produced with constant returns to scale technology I  cannot 
completely monopolize the downstream market by buying up the input. However, by 
buying some input /  can raise rival's marginal costs (overbuying increases its own 
average but not marginal costs) and gain a competitive advantage in the final good 
market.
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The condition for overbuying in Proposition 3.1 can be shown to be equivalent
to
(3-25) (py - c x - c y) -  (px - c j > 0 .
where the prices are evaluated at an overbuying equilibrium. Equation (3.25) is thus a 
necessary condition for overbuying. Accordingly, a sufficient condition for not buying 
input is:
(3-26) (py - c x - c y) - § x - c j < .  0.
Corollary 3.1. The integrated firm will not buy input if  at an overbuying equilibrium
the price-cost margin o f the final good, (p - c - c ), is smaller than or equal to they x y
price-cost margin o f the input, (px - cJ .
Here the price-cost margin of the input is the loss per unit of input when I  buys it in the 
market at price px rather than uses internal supplies at a lower cost c .
The intuition behind Corollary 3.1 is the following. Suppose overbuying is an
equilibrium and the equilibrium prices are p  and p  . Suppose also that overbuying is
y %
such a powerful strategy that when /  buys an amount x  of input, D's final good 
production decreases by x and I's final good production increases by the same amount. 2 1  
(Note that the final good price does not change.) If /  stopped buying input its profit
from final good would decrease by x(p - c ) but it would save xp . Subtract xc fromy y x x
21Clearly overbuying does not improve rs competitive position this much. But the reasoning in the text 
gives a sufficient condition for not buying input
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both terms and we have the condition in Corollary 3.1. Therefore if (p - c - c )  isy X  y
smaller than (p - c J ,  overbuying cannot be an equilibrium.
Note that in fact this argument is rather general: it does not depend on the 
linearity of demand. Corollary 3.1, and indeed Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 below, are true 
without Assumption 3.1.
When the integrated firm is quite inefficient in the downstream market it will 
supply input to its rival. Its upstream unit makes a profit from selling input but 
ultimately this input competes with its own final good and lowers the downstream unit's 
profit.
In line with Corollary 3.1, we have:
Corollary 3.2. The integrated firm will not sell input to its rival if  at a vertical supply
equilibrium the profit margin o f the final good, (p - c - c ) ,  is greater than or equal toy x y
the profit margin o f the input, (px - c J .
We can prove Corollary 3.2 by the same kind of reasoning that was behind
Corollary 3.1. Suppose first that firm I  sells input to firm D  and the equilibrium prices
are p  and p  . This strategy cannot be an equilibrium if firm I  could profitably deviate x y
from it given rivals’ strategies. In particular, if firm I  shifted all the input it currently
sells to firm D  to internal final good production22, 1  would earn a profit margin (p - c
y %
- cy) per unit. (Note that the final good price would not change, because firm D's final
22This is not necessarily the best strategy for firm I to follow; it may choose to produce internally at a 
different level. But the reasoning in the text gives a sufficient condition for foreclosure.
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good production would decrease by the same amount as firm /'s final good production 
increased. Firm D's input would be reduced to that supplied by firm U.) Clearly then, 
if  (Py ~ cx ~ cy) exceeded (px - c J  it would not be optimal for firm I  to supply D.
Foreclosure becomes a knife-edge in our model. Everywhere else except when 
cy ~ — integrated firm is active in the input market; /  either sells or buys input. We 
can show that:
Corollary 3.3. The integrated firm will sell input to its rival if  at the foreclosure
equilibrium the profit margin o f the final good, (p - c - c J ,  is smaller than the profity x y
margin o f the input, (px - cx).23
The intuition behind Corollary 3.3 is straightforward. Suppose first that
foreclosure is an equilibrium and the equilibrium prices are p  and p  . Firm I  considers
y %
if it can make more profit by selling one unit of input to firm D  and reducing final 
good production by one unit. If the profit margin for its unit of input sold to firm D , 
(px - c^y is greater than that for the unit of input produced internally, (p^ - cx - c^), then 
it is clearly not optimal for firm /  to foreclose.
Above we have derived intuitive conditions in terms of the difference in the 
profit margins of final good and input. Now we turn to examining what the relative 
costs can tell us. First suppose that the downstream firms are equally efficient (c = 
(P), Substituting in (3.14) and using Assumption 3.3 shows that the integrated
firm will overbuy. This proves that:
23Spencer and Jones (1991) obtain an equivalent to this Corollary.
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Corollary 3.4. If the integrated firm is more or equally efficient in transforming the 
input into the final good than its unintegrated rival, then it will buy input.
When the integrated firm is more efficient in the final good production, it can 
afford to raise its average costs in order to have an even better competitive position. 
While only if the integrated firm is less efficient, it will ever sell input. If it is in any 
case in weak position in the final good market, it may as well sell some input and make 
a profit from it.
Note that above we have been comparing the net marginal costs of the final
good. The gross marginal cost of final good for D  is ip + cD) and for /  is (c + c ).x y x y
Even if /'s gross marginal cost of the final good were lower than D's, it can 
nevertheless be optimal for I  to sell input to D . f s  net marginal cost (c^) can still be 
higher than D's (c^). The divergence between gross and net cost differentials arises 
simply because of the fact that the input price is greater than marginal cost (px > c )^.
If also the upstream firms are equally efficient (c^= and cy= <P) it is still 
true that the integrated firm overbuys. Salinger (1988) showed that when firms are 
equally efficient, the integrated firm will not sell input. Our results confirm it. 
However, we also show that overbuying would arise in his model, a strategy he did not 
consider.
Equal upstream costs alone (c  ^ = c^) do not fix the integrated firm's strategy. 
Depending on the relative downstream costs, /  either sells or buys input. Spencer and 
Jones (1991) suggest that identical upstream costs make vertical supply unprofitable. 
We show that the crucial issue is the relative downstream costs.
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3.5 Final Good Market
If I  is very inefficient in the downstream market it may exit and operate only in 
the upstream market The calculations in Section 3.3 ignored the non-negativity 
constraint > 0. In this Section we investigate if this constraint is indeed slack or 
binding by checking whether the right-hand-side of (3.17) is positive or not. Firm /'s 
decision in which markets to operate depends crucially on its downstream net marginal 
cost. Again, it is useful to define the critical value C for to be that which makes the 
right-hand-side of (3.17) equal to zero:
(3.27) C = ( 7 a -  9 c x  + 2 c Ux  + 4 c D ) H 1 .
Proposition 3.2 follows directly from (3.17).
Proposition 3.2. The integrated firm operates in the downstream market if  and only if
c < c .
y
This critical value V  gives the point at which I  will exit from the downstream market.
The right-hand-side of (3.17) can be shown to be equivalent to the profit margin 
of the final good, (p  - cx - c^).
Corollary 3.5. The integrated firm will exit from the downstream market if  its profit
margin o f the final good, (p - c - c ), is non-positive.y x y
In Ts strategy in the input market there was a trade-off between gain in the final 
market and loss in the input market. Accordingly, the decision depended on the
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difference in the price-cost margins of the two products. The exit decision is simpler: it 
depends solely on the profit margin of the final good. When firm I  is in the position to 
choose downstream output, the upstream competition is already past.
3.6 Comparative Statics
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows firm Ts final 
good production as a fraction of its total production, yjiyj+x^ . This fraction describes 
firm /'s optimal product mix. (Thanks to fixed coefficient technology with constant 
returns to scale, and a unit coefficient, we can properly add to x^) When /  overbuys, 
Xj is negative and the fraction is greater than one. 2 4  Under foreclosure xJ is equal to 
zero and the fraction is equal to one. With vertical supply the fraction is smaller than 
one. Finally, when /  exits yf and the fraction are equal to zero. It follows from 
Assumption 3.3 that 0 < C < U, that is the regions for overbuying, vertical supply and 
exit exist.
Below, we will be examining the comparative static properties for firm Ts 
product mix; and also the absolute levels of its input sales or purchases and final good 
production. Remember in what follows that the optimal Xj (and C) depend on the 
difference in the profit margins of the final good and input. And the optimal y7  (and U) 
depend on the profit margin of the final good only.
First, however, it is useful to understand how prices move with changes in the 
parameters. One would expect that both input and final good prices would increase in 
the demand and cost parameters. But in fact there are two important exceptions.
^Assumption 3.3 guarantees that (y^+x^  > 0.
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(0 An increase in decreases the input price because the demand for input by firm D  
will shift back, (ii) An increase in also decreases the input price. With vertical 
supply firm I  will increase its supplies to D  when selling input becomes relatively more 
profitable than selling final good. With overbuying the demand for input by I  will 
decrease because it is more difficult the gain a competitive advantage in the 
downstream market.
With these properties in mind, let us now turn to firm Ts output decisions, in 
particular its choice of quantities and y/5 and its product mix yJfXj+yj).
An increase in the demand for the final good (a rise in a) increases the final 
good price more than the input price. That is, the difference in the profit margins of 
the final good and input (and C), and the profit margin of the final good (and U), all 
increase. Accordingly, an increase in demand will increase Ts final good production 
and decrease (increase) the amount of input I  sells (buys). Overbuying becomes more 
likely and exit less likely. This effect is illustrated by the broken line in Figure 3.2.25
An increase in firm D's downstream marginal cost (<P) increases the final good 
price but decreases the input price because the demand for input by firm D  shifts back. 
The difference in the profit margins (and Q , and the profit margin of the final good 
(and U)y both increase - and overbuying becomes more likely and exit less likely. Firm 
I's input sales decrease (purchases increase) and final good production increases; the 
share of final good in its product mix rises.
25The intercept in the vertical axis does not necessarily increase; the change in product mix is 
ambiguous.
78
By contrast, an increase in firm Ts upstream marginal cost ( c j  will increase 
final good price more than the input price and, consequently, will lower the profit 
margin of the final good less than that of the input. That is, the difference in the profit 
margins and C increase but V  decreases. The broken line in Figure 3.3 illustrates this 
comparative static effect; notice that overbuying and exit both become more likely and 
vertical supply less likely. In absolute terms, both input sales and final good 
production decrease and input purchases increase. (The shift in the product mix is 
ambiguous.)
A decrease in firm ITs upstream marginal cost (c^) will decrease the final good 
price less than the input price. We have again the case in Figure 3.3 where both 
overbuying and exit become more likely and vertical supply less likely and firm /  will 
sell less of both products.
Finally, an increase in firm Ts net downstream marginal cost (c^) decreases the 
profit margin of the final good more than that of the input. Accordingly, the difference 
in the profit margins decreases and the share of the input in firm /'s product mix 
increases. In Figure 3.3 this would mean moving along the solid line to the right. The 
absolute level of firm Fs input sales increases and final good production and input 
purchases decrease.
Active Integrated Firm in the Input Market
Above we have examined only the signs of the comparative static effects. Their 
magnitudes are of interest too. For brevity, here we focus only on the magnitudes of 
the firms' responses to changes in costs. How are these magnitudes affected by the 
presence of an active integrated firm in the input market?
79
We rewrite the coefficients from equations (3.13), (3.16), (3.17), (3.19), (3.21) 
and (3.22) in Table 3.1 to make the comparison of the coefficients clearer.
xu = xu
r\
xu
n r\
yD
ii
r\
cuX -20 -16 -12 -16 6 8
cX 10 8 6 8 -27 -28
cDy -8 -16
-24 -16 12 8
cy -2 8
18 8 -33 -28
Note: All the coefficients should be divided by 486. The coefficients for Xj are omitted, since they all 
equal zero when there is foreclosure.
Table 3.1
One clear and interesting message from the Table is summarized in the 
following proposition.
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Proposition 3.3. I f  the integrated firm  is active in the input market, firms react more 
aggressively to changes in costs (either their own, or their rivals’) in their own market; 
hut they react less aggressively to changes in costs in the other market26
Let us take an example. Consider firm D's response to a change in firm r s  
marginal cost of input, c .^ From the Table we see that the marginal effect on firm D's 
production, yD, is 6/48b if /  is active in the input market but 8/48h if there is 
foreclosure. Notice that here we are looking at a change in costs in the "other" market; 
Proposition 3.3 tells us that firm D should respond less aggressively to a change in c if 
I  is active (6/48b < 8/48b). Now consider firm U. The marginal effect on firm C/'s 
production, x ^  of a change in c is 10/48ft if /  is active, but only 8/48b if there is 
foreclosure. Again, this marries with Proposition 3.3: firm U responds more 
aggressively to a change in costs in its own market if  I  is active in the input market 
(10/48& > 8/48/?).
In brief, the economics behind these comparisons is the following.
First, consider the case of foreclosure. There is a single chain of effects: a rise 
in firm Ts marginal cost of input, c ,^ causes its supply of final good, yjy to fall. By the 
usual Cournot logic (strategic substitutes) firm D's supply, yD, will rise and its demand 
for input rises concomitantly. Firm U (the monopoly supplier in this case of 
foreclosure) sells more: x u  rises.
Now, if  the integrated firm is active in the input market, there is an additional 
chain of effects. The rise in c causes firm I  to reduce its supply Xj to the input market
26Note that the coefficient for even changes sign in the equation for x^ .
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or to increase its demand for input. So the input price, p  , rises. This rise in input 
price means that firm D  supplies less; yD falls. Notice that this works in the opposite 
direction than the (dominant) effect given in the previous paragraph. That is, an active 
integrated firm makes firm D  to respond less aggressively to a rise in c , as per 
Proposition 3.3. Firm U, on the other hand, will choose to supply more to the input 
market (xu  rises) as px rises. This reinforces the effect given in the previous 
paragraph: vertical supply makes firm U respond more aggressively to a rise in - 
again, as per Proposition 3.3.
From Proposition 3.3 we know that these comparative effects are in fact 
general, at least to this linear model.
3.7 Toughness of Competition
The previous Sections focused on the cost asymmetries as a driving force
behind the integrated firm’s strategy in the input market. The second natural candidate
affecting the profitability of vertical supply and overbuying is the toughness of
competition in the final good market. Now we assume that the firms are equally
efficient with c the marginal cost of input and c the net marginal cost of the final 
x  y
good. We further assume that the demand for firm i's final good takes the following 
form:
(3.28) p . = [a(l+2p) - (l+p)y.  - pyy]/(l+2p)
where a  > 0 and 0 < p < p. This demand function has the property that in the 
terminology of Shaked and Sutton (1990) the expansion effect is constant and the 
competition effect is a function of p. We can therefore refer to p as the degree of
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competition. The role of p is more transparent from the inverse of this demand 
function: y. = a  - p.  - p(p.-pj). p  describes how badly the firm suffers from charging a 
higher price than its rival. Solving the model gives:
(a-c - c )(l+2p) ( 1-p +p)
(3.29)    =-
'  (2+3p)(2+4p+p )
It follows from equation (3.29) that:
Proposition 3.4. I f  there is no competition in the final good market the integrated firm  
will sell input. If competition is very tough the integrated firm will overbuy.
When the two downstream firms are monopolies in their respective markets (p
= 0) the integrated firm sells input (Xj > 0). It makes a profit from vertical supply and
that has no harmful effects whatsoever on its profit from the final market. When the
degree of competition increases input sales start to have an adverse effect on the
2
downstream profit. When p is high enough to make (1-p +p) negative the integrated 
firm starts buying input. By overbuying the integrated firm can gain a dominant 
position in a highly competitive market.
3.8 International Trade
One interpretation of our model is that firm D  is in the domestic country, and U 
and I  are foreign exporters. Firm D  sells the final good in the domestic market in 
competition with 71 s exports. Furthermore, D  is dependent for its input on imports from 
U  and I. Cost asymmetries arise naturally in this international trade setting as a 
consequence of different endowments or technologies. We further include
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transportation costs for the integrated firm. Firm I  incurres the per unit transportation
costs t for the input and t for the final good. We do not include transportation costs x  y
for the unintegrated firms: the marginal cost of the unintegrated firms can be thought as 
consisting of the marginal cost of production and transportation costs.27 D can be 
assumed to have zero transportation costs because it is in the domestic country.
Furthermore, we could interpret tx and t as tariffs, which are zero for the domestic
firm.
Now the integrated firm's profit function is:
(3.3)’ nt  = xfpx -cx - t j  + y / Py - V  V V  i i x i > 0
(3.3)" Kj  =  xt(px - c j  +  y / p y - cx - c y - t y) i fXj  <  0
We need two variants because when I  sells input it pays the transportation cost itself 
but when I  buys input the transportation cost is incurred by U.
The sufficient condition for not selling input given by Corollary 3.2 is now:
(3.30) (py - c x - c y - t y) - ( p x - c x - t x) > 0
We can obtain a (stronger) sufficient condition by comparing the difference in the 
profit margins with firm D's profit margin (which we know is positive, since yD is
positive). Specifically, subtracting firm D's profit margin, (p - cD - p \  from they y  x
difference in firm f s  profit margins the price terms drop out, and we are left with a 
sufficient condition which only involves underlying cost parameters:
27We also assume that the transportation cost U pays for selling to D and I is equal.
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(3.31) <cy + y  < (cDy + t j
Corollary 3.6. I f  it is cheaper to produce the final good in the exporting country and 
transport it to the domestic country (with unit cost (c + t^)) than it is to transport the 
input to the domestic country and produce the final good there (with unit cost (c1^  + 
t j ) ,  then the integrated firm will not sell input to its rival.
Notice that condition (3.31) depends on the relative efficiency of the
downstream firms, (c - cD), and on the difference in the transportation costs, (t - t ) .y y y *
Suppose first that the transportation costs are equal (t = t This reproduces the result 
of Corollary 3.4: when the integrated firm is more efficient in the final good production 
it will not sell input. Whereas if firm I  is less efficient in final good production than 
firm D, it can be profitable for /  to sell part of its input production to its rival - even 
though that will lower the price for its own final good. Note that the difference in net 
marginal costs of the final good need not be due to different production technologies. 
It may be that the costs of inputs other than x  differ between I  and D. For example the 
labour costs may well differ across countries.
Next, assume instead that that firms D  and I  are equally efficient in final good 
production (c  ^ = c^). Now it can be optimal for firm I  to sell input to firm D  if the 
final good is more expensive to transport than the input. When we interpret the 
transportation costs as tariffs this comparison implies that the domestic country can 
induce supply of input by imposing a greater tariff on the final good than on the input.
Transportation cost for the input introduces a wedge between the price-cost 
margins for input when I  sells or buys input. This means that foreclosure is not a
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knife-edge anymore. Between the regions for overbuying and vertical supply there is a 
region where the integrated firm does not participate in the input market either as a 
buyer or seller.
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4 Endogenous Industry Structure in Vertical Duopoly
4.1 Introduction
We aim to develop some fairly general properties for the degree of integration 
in the industry. We first analyse in detail a model where there is Cournot competition 
in the input market. Then we compare the results to those of a model where nonlinear 
prices are applied in the input market (Bertrand competition). We show that in both 
cases qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges.
Incentives for integration in a vertical duopoly are driven by three externalities. 
First, we have the vertical externality of double-marginalization. Second, a horizontal 
externality emerges when downstream firms compete in the product market. Third, 
there is an excessive supply incentive: every additional unit of input an upstream firm 
sells to one downstream firm reduces the profit of the other downstream firm by 
depressing the final good price. An unintegrated upstream firm does not take this 
marginal effect on the downstream firm's profit into account and therefore sells too 
much input to the other firm. Double-marginalization effect is proportional to the 
upstream firm’s profit margin since that is the distortion in question. Excessive supply 
incentive is the greater, the higher is the downstream firm's profit margin because then 
the loss from increased rival's output is highest. The horizontal effect depends on both 
margins. High downstream margin tells that there is a large gain from expanding 
output. While high upstream margin means that the input cost will be much lower after 
integration.
In our model there are two upstream firms and two downstream firms. The 
benefit of integration is profit sharing between an upstream firm and a downstream
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firm: vertical externalities are internalized. Vertical integration does not, of course, 
internalize the horizontal externality. In fact, integration makes the competition more 
tough. The cost of integration arises from a loss in efficiency and it is assumed to be 
fixed. We find that the degree of integration is increasing in the size of the 
downstream market. The profit margin for both input and final good are higher and 
therefore all three effects work in the same direction to favour integration. The second 
result relates to a situation where two upstream firms differ in efficiency. It is 
intuitively clear that the present model will favour integration by the low-cost firm 
because it has a higher profit margin and accordingly suffers from greater externalities 
if unintegrated. Thirdly an industrywide cost increase and higher fixed cost of 
integration result in a lower degree of integration. All these predictions are robust to 
the form of competition in the input market
This analysis also helps us to understand the evolution of the industry structure 
over time. We predict that in a young market where demand is low and average 
marginal cost is high (because the learning process is in the beginning) we would see a 
nonintegrated structure. When the market starts growing and the firms slide down the 
learning curve the industry becomes more integrated.
Stigler (1951) makes the opposite prediction to us: vertical disintegration is the 
typical development in growing industries, vertical integration in declining industries. 
Stigler views production of a final good as a series of distinct functions. Certain 
functions are subject to decreasing costs. A young market may be too small to support 
a firm specialized in the function subject to decreasing costs. But when the market 
expands, the demand for that function becomes sufficient to permit a firm specialized 
in performing it; the firms spin off the decreasing cost functions and purchase input 
from the new firm. However, setting up a specialized firm is not the only way to
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exploit the economies of scale. One integrated firm could produce this input for itself 
and for the other firms in the industry whatever the size of the market and thus avoid 
the set-up cost of a new firm. Empirical evidence also suggests that firms frequently 
integrate as a result of rising, not declining, demand.28
Salinger (1988) examines how a vertical merger of successive Cournot 
oligopolists affects the input and final good price. He finds that a vertical merger does 
not necessarily increase the prices although a merger leads to foreclosure. The 
incentives to integrate are the same as in our model. We allow the upstream firms to 
differ in efficiency and endogenize the integration decision. Ordover, Saloner, and 
Salop (1990) abstract from double-marginalization by assuming Bertrand competition 
between equally efficient upstream firms; the input price is driven down to marginal 
cost. In their model the incentive for integration arises from the assumption that an 
integrated firm can commit not to supply a rival firm below a certain price. Then the 
unintegrated upstream firm can raise the input price which will benefit also the 
integrated firm. Ordover, Saloner, and Salop do not explain why such a commitment is 
feasible and why the firms have to integrate to be able to commit to such a strategy. In 
our model foreclosure arises in equilibrium without incredible commitments. In Hart 
and Tirole (1990) upstream firms set nonlinear prices (essentially Bertrand 
competition). Low-cost upstream firm has an incentive for integration to restrict 
competition in the downstream market. Integrated supplier can undercut its high-cost 
rival slightly, so that the unintegrated firm buys the same total amount as before but 
now buys from the integrated supplier. This again benefits the integrated firm by
28Porter and Livesay (1971), 132, and Chandler (1977), 490.
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raising rival’s costs. We show that the predictions this model gives for the degree of 
integration are qualitatively the same as ours.
Several papers focus on integration decisions in a setting where two upstream 
firms sell exclusively to two respective downstream firms.29 Double-marginalization 
and horizontal externality arise in this setting. If integration induces the rival to be less 
aggressive, the horizontal externality gives another reason for integration. In other 
words, when final goods are strategic substitutes it is good to be a top dog in the 
downstream market and integrate to have a lower marginal cost.30 Both vertical and 
horizontal externality call for integration. However, when final goods are strategic 
complements the profitable strategy is to be a puppy dog in the downstream market. To 
eliminate the vertical externality the input price should be equal to marginal cost but to 
relax the horizontal externality the input price should be higher. Relaxing competition 
proves to be more important. Tougher competition represents the cost of integration.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce our 
model. Section 4.3 compares the industry structures and Section 4.4 derives the 
equilibrium industry structure. In Section 4.5 welfare issues are analysed. In Section 
4.6 we compare our model to Hart and Tirole's (1990).
29E.g. Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Bonnano and Vickers (1988), Lin (1988), Gal-Or 
(1991) and (1992).
30We use the terminology of Bulow et al. (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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4.2 The Model
There are two upstream firms, U1 and U2, producing a homogeneous input, x., 
and two downstream firms, D1 and D2, producing a homogeneous final good, y.. Firms 
have constant returns to scale in the production of input and final good. Furthermore, 
the final good is produced with a fixed coefficient technology and a unit coefficient for 
the input x . U1 is more efficient in producing the input than U2; c < c 0 where c. is the
1 & I
marginal cost of input for Ui. The downstream firms are equally efficient and, without 
loss of generality, we assume that transforming input into the final good is costless.
Demand function for the final good is linear p^ = a - b(yl  + y2), where is the 
price of the final good and a and b are positive constants. We further make the 
following assumption about the size of the downstream market.
Assumption 4.1. The market for the final good is big enough to accommodate both 
firms. Specifically, a is sufficiently large that the following inequalities are satisfied:
(i) a > c .fo r all i, and
(ii) a > l l c 2 - 10cj.
Our focus is on the question when the firms will stay independent and when 
they will vertically integrate. (Horizontal mergers are ruled out by antitrust statutes.) 
Four structural configurations can emerge: nonintegration, partial integration by the 
low-cost firm, partial integration by the high-cost firm, and full integration.
The decision timing structure of our model is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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stage 0 stage 1 stage 2
integration upstream firms downstream firms
decisions choose x. choose y.
Figure 4.1
At stage 0 the firms decide whether to integrate with a full understanding of the 
consequences of this decision for the competition in the upstream and downstream 
markets. We assume that Ui can integrate only with Di.  Because the downstream 
firms are identical, this is not a restrictive assumption. Integration is irreversible. The 
benefit of integration is profit sharing between an upstream firm and a downstream 
firm; the vertical externalities are internalized. The cost of integration arising from a 
loss in efficiency is assumed to be fixed, E. An integrated firm may be less efficient 
because a non-owning manager has lower incentives to come up with good ideas to 
reduce production costs or to raise quality because this investment is expropriated by 
the owner of the firm. Also, there may be a loss in information about the non-owning 
manager's performance, and therefore less incentive to make improvements. 
Furthermore, there may be legal costs of the merger.
At stage 1 the upstream firms choose how much input to sell to the downstream 
firms given the industry structure. In the input market the upstream firms are Cournot 
duopolists whereas the buyers of input (the downstream firms) take the input price as 
given. Price taking is just the extreme case where the upstream firms have all the 
bargaining power. The nature of the vertical externalities would not change if the 
bargaining power were more equally distributed. The crucial assumption is that pricing
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is linear. Linear prices apply when the downstream firms could bootleg. When the 
upstream firms can observe whether or not the downstream firm carries his product, 
two-part tariffs are optimal contracts (Rey and Tirole (1986)). This alternative 
assumption about upstream competition is discussed in Section 4.6. Only unintegrated 
firms are active in the input market; the integrated firms neither sell nor buy input in 
the market. Chapter 3 showed that when the firms are equally efficient in final good 
production the integrated firm does not sell input to its rival. However, under partial 
integration the integrated firm would buy input to raise its unintegrated rival's costs. 
Including these input purchases would only slightly change the tendencies for 
integration but would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Therefore we simply 
assume that the integrated firm will not buy input. (See Chapter 3 for the overbuying 
strategy of the integrated firm.) We also assume that exclusive dealing contracts where 
an upstream firm commits to supplying only one downstream firm are not enforceable.
At stage 2 the downstream firms choose the final good production levels given 
the input price and the industry structure. The equilibrium in this downstream market 
generates the derived demand curve for the input at stage 1. Downstream firms behave 
as Cournot duopolists in the final good market. Cournot competition is justified by our 
assumptions about the decision timing structure. The downstream market game is 
played by firms with capacity constraints and the outcome will be Cournot if Cj and c2 
are high enough.31
The profit function of an integrated firm is:
(4.1) K. = y.(p - c.) - E
31Tirole (1988), 215.
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and the profit functions of unintegrated firms are:
(4.2) nTr = x.(p - c.); andUi x v
(43) *Di = yfPy - Px>
where p  is the input price.
4.3 Comparison of Industry Structures
We solve the model by backward induction starting from the last stage. First, 
we solve for the equilibrium in the downstream market given the input price and the 
industry structure. The equilibrium in the downstream market generates the derived 
demand function for the input. Second, we insert this demand function in the upstream 
firms’ profit functions and solve for the equilibrium in the upstream market given the 
industry structure. Third, we return back to the downstream market to ascertain the 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Substituting the input price we get the equilibrium in the 
downstream market in terms of exogenous parameters and the industry structure. (See 
Appendix 4 for details.) This is how we obtain the profit functions relevant for the 
stage 0 integration decisions. Under nonintegration (NI) the profits for the upstream 
and downstream firms are:
(4.4)
(4.5)
= 2(a - 2c. + c f f f l b ;  and Ui v i /
= (2a - Cj - c / m b .
Under partial integration by Ui and D i (PIi) the profits are:
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(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
7tf/‘ = (a - 2c. + c.)2/246;Uj v J  v
/ ' !  = (a - 2c. + c.)2/366; and
D j  K J  i
/ “  = (5a - 7c. + 2c.)2/ 1446 - E.
I V I J
And under full integration (FI) we have:
(4.9) / '  = (a -  2c. + c.)2/96 - E.
/ I J
Incentives for integration are driven by three externalities. Consider first a 
successive monopoly (Spengler (1950)). The vertical externality of double­
marginalization arises because an unintegrated downstream firm does not take the 
upstream firm's marginal profit into account when output is increased. Because the 
downstream firm cares only about its own profit, it tends to make decisions that lead to 
too low a consumption of input; the industry produces less than the monopoly output. 
Integration internalizes this externality and enables the industry to earn monopoly 
profits. The incentive for integration is the greater, the greater is the distortion (px -
Next consider an industry where two upstream firms sell exclusively to two 
respective downstream firms. Now a horizontal externality emerges; the downstream 
firms destroy profits by competing. Integration does not internalize the horizontal 
externality since, by assumption, an upstream firm can integrate with only one 
downstream firm. However, integration has a horizontal effect. High marginal costs 
(nonintegration) enable the downstream firms to restrict industry output. But given that 
the rival has high marginal cost the other firm has an incentive to integrate. This will 
result in lower output by the rival (because reaction functions are downward sloping) 
which has a positive first order effect on the merged firm's profit. Therefore
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integration increases the joint profit of the vertical structure not only because double- 
marginalization is eliminated but also because integration makes the firm a top dog in 
the downstream market. In the second vertical merger the horizontal effect is the 
greater, the larger is the change in the merged firm marginal cost, (P^~ c.), and the 
higher that firm's profit margin was originally, (pP ~^ pPJ^ )32 The latter term describes 
the benefit from expanding output. If the industry output was already very high (low 
profit margin) there is little gain from expanding output. In the first vertical merger 
also the input price for the rival changes. Therefore the horizontal effect depends on 
how much more favourable the cost change is for the merged firm, (p^ - c. - p ^  + pPIi) 
= (pPIi- c . \  and how profitable the expansion of output is, {pNJ -  pNJ ) .33
Lastly suppose that the upstream firms can sell to both downstream firms. Then 
an excessive supply incentive arises. An unintegrated upstream firm Ui ignores that 
every unit of input it sells to D j depresses the final price and reduces Di's profits by
|y.(dpJdy-t I which is equivalent to Di's profit margin. An unintegrated Ui is selling 
too much input to D j compared with the level that would maximize the joint profit of 
Ui-Di. Excessive supply incentive arises only in nonintegrated industry since under 
partial integration the integrated firm does not buy input from the unintegrated 
upstream firm. Table 4.1 summarizes these three effects.
32Taylor series give the following expression for the horizontal effect:
(djt^ j/dyjHdyJdc.Xc.- pPIj) + ( < ? Idy.dc.)(dyJdc.)(c.- pPJJ)2/2 =
(pPIj- pPlj)(pPIj- c.)/3b + (pPIj- c.)2/9b ry rx rx i rx i
33The expression for the horizontal effect of the first vertical merger is very complicated and therefore 
we omit it here. Also what we say in the text is a simplification but serves well to help the intuition.
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NI pi/
Excessive supply (p n,- pn i)M'y r  x J 0
Double-marginalization ( p ™ c? ( p f  - c .)
Horizontal effect
Table 4.1
We denote by ir. the vertical structure Ui-DVs joint profit whether it is 
integrated or not; n. = + itDj. it. stands for the variable profit, that is, profit gross
of integration cost. Thus a vertically integrated firm's profit is % -  n. - E and an 
unintegrated firm's profit is it. = f t . We can easily obtain the following observation 
about profit levels ignoring the integration cost.
Observation 4.1. if/* < i f } <  if!1 < iff*
i i i i
Proof: In Appendix 4.
First, integration increases the variable profit of the vertical structure ( i f 1* > if!1 
and i f !  > if.^). The vertical externalities are internalized and in addition integration 
has a positive horizontal effect as explained earlier. Second, vertical integration 
imposes a negative externality on the rival < if!1 and if!1 < i f f 1). The merged 
firm competes more aggressively in the downstream market which makes the rival less 
aggressive and lowers its profits. Also the upstream unit has lower profits because the
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demand for input has decreased. Third, each firm is worse off under full integration 
than under nonintegration (tF.1 < Under full integration both firms have lower
marginal costs and are more aggressive and, consequently, destroy profits by 
competing. Although the vertical externalities are internalized the negative horizontal 
effect dominates and joint profits are lower under full integration than under 
nonintegration. Figure 4.2 helps us to understand this result. The solid line shows the 
monopoly output (assume for a moment that c = c2). The closer the equilibrium is to 
the solid line, the higher is the producer surplus ignoring the integration costs. We can
see that nonintegration has the advantage of restricting output. In fact, it restricts
output too much; the industry produces less final good than a monopoly would produce. 
However, output under nonintegration is closer to the monopoly output than output 
under full integration.
We will now proceed to discuss the comparative statics for the incentives for 
integration. We can show that:
Proposition 4.1. (i) The more efficient firm has a greater incentive to integrate.
The incentive to integrate is
(ii) decreasing in the degree o f integration,
(iii) increasing in the size o f the downstream market,
(iv) decreasing in firm's own marginal costs,
(v) increasing in rival's marginal costs, and
(vi) decreasing in the average marginal cost o f the industry.
Proof: In Appendix 4.
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The proof of Proposition 4.1 is done with the profit functions (4.4)-(4.9) but 
here we offer intuitive discussion in terms of the profit margins that describe the three 
effects of a vertical merger (see Table 4.1).
The low-cost upstream firm has a greater incentive to integrate because its profit 
margin is greater than that of the high-cost firm; both double-marginalization and 
horizontal effect are greater for the low-cost firm.
The incentive to integrate is greater under nonintegration than under partial 
integration. Suppose first that the input price is the same under both structures and the 
upstream firms do not cross supply (that is Ui sells input to D i only). Even in this 
setting there are diminishing returns to integration. Expansion of output is less 
profitable if the rival has already expanded because of the horizontal effect. Now take 
into account that the input price actually decreases after a vertical merger. (We explain 
the reason for the lower input price in the next paragraph.) Therefore the double- 
marginalization is smaller under partial integration and this further reduces the 
incentive for integration. Lastly consider cross supply. Under partial integration there 
is no excessive supply incentive which gives another reason for lower incentive for 
integration under partial integration.
A vertical merger results in a lower input price because of two effects on the 
input market. First, the market power of the remaining supplier increases (in fact, it 
has now monopoly). Second, the merged firm produces more final good which shifts 
the residual demand curve of the unintegrated downstream firm back. Accordingly, the 
demand for the input decreases. These two effects on the input price go in the opposite 
direction. Salinger (1988) showed that the second effect dominates (and the input price 
decreases) if  and only if  less than half of the upstream firms are integrated before the
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merger. This is why we get this rather surprising effect in duopoly: a vertical merger 
decreases input price although the integrated firm forecloses the upstream market.
The incentive to integrate is the greater, the greater is the market for final good. 
All three effects work in the same direction to favour integration. The input price (and 
the upstream firm’s profit margin) is increasing in the size of the market and the final 
price increases more than the input price and therefore the downstream firm's profit 
margin increases as well.
The incentive is decreasing in the firm's own marginal cost because a per cent 
increase in marginal cost increases input price by less than a per cent, which results in 
a lower profit margin for the upstream firm. Downstream firm's profit margin 
decreases as well because final price increases less than the input price.
An increase in rival's cost increases both double-marginalization and horizontal 
effect under partial integration. Under nonintegration double-marginalization is higher, 
excessive supply incentive is lower and the change in horizontal effect is ambiguous 
since the upstream firm's profit margin increases and the downstream firm's profit 
margin decreases. The first effect is dominant and the incentive to integrate is higher. 
An increase in rival's marginal cost increases input price. It is obvious that input price 
is increasing in rival's marginal cost when it is selling input. When the rival is 
integrated (and does not sell input) an increase in its marginal cost decreases its final 
good production which increases the unintegrated firm's final good production, its 
demand for input and, accordingly, the input price. An increase in rival's marginal cost 
increases the downstream firm's profit margin under partial integration but decreases it 
under nonintegration. Under nonintegration it is not only rival's cost that increases 
because both downstream firms buy input from both upstream firms. We can also
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show that an industrywide cost increase lowers the incentive to integrate; the firm's 
own cost effect is dominant.
4.4 Equilibrium Industry Structure
Proposition 4.1 allows us to construct Figure 4.3 which shows the equilibrium 
industry structures for various pairs of integration costs (E) and efficiency differences 
(c2 " c? '  ^ ie is drawn for given values of market size and average marginal 
cost of the industry. The efficiency difference cannot be too big, otherwise U2 would 
not have positive output (which Assumption 4.1 ensures). The two middle locuses can 
cross when the market for final good is quite small. In the diagram we take the 
simplest case but Proposition 4.2 takes into account the possibility that these locuses 
may cross. We restrict ourselves to pure strategy equilibria.
Proposition 4.2. The equilibrium industry structure is
(i) full integration, if  and only ifri,^  - iFj1 > E,
(ii) partial integration by the low-cost firm, if tF^ - iFf1 < E and i f f  - tFJ2 > E, or
% I 2 -JZ i < E a n d if ; l l - J ? > E .
(iii) partial integration by either firm (i.e. there are two equilibria), if  and only if tFj1 - 
tF}2 < E and tF*2 - > E
(iv) nonintegration, if and only ifiFj11 - < E.
To interpret Figure 4.3, consider the effect of greater integration cost and fix the 
values of other variables. When the integration cost is high neither firm has an 
incentive to integrate; nonintegration emerges. When we lower the integration cost it 
becomes profitable for the low-cost firm to integrate; we have partial integration by the 
low-cost firm. For even lower integration cost also the high-cost firm can bear the
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integration cost if the other firm does not bandwagon. Also the low-cost firm integrates 
if  the other firm does not. We have two equilibria: partial integration by either firm. 
For still lower integration cost the low-cost firm integrates whatever the high-cost firm 
does and, accordingly, the high-cost firm does not integrate; we have again partial 
integration by the low-cost firm. When integration cost is very low even the high-cost 
firm can bear it whatever the rival does and full integration occurs. Note that we have 
two completely different regions where partial integration by the low-cost firm is the 
unique equilibrium. In region PI 1(a) only the low-cost firm can bear the integration 
cost. And in region PI1(Z?) the high-cost firm can bear the integration cost only if the 
rival does not bandwagon. But because the low-cost firm integrates whatever the high- 
cost firm does, the high-cost firm will not integrate.
Next consider the effect of the cost difference keeping integration cost constant 
(that is, choose a point from the vertical axis). When the firms are equally efficient {c1 
= <?2) we are in the vertical axis. For the intermediate values of E only one firm can 
integrate. Because the firms are identical either firm can integrate in all of this range; 
there are two equilibria PI1 and PI2. Now increase the efficiency difference. The 
greater is the efficiency difference, the more likely it is that we end up in a region 
where only the low-cost firm integrates (PI1). However, starting from any point in the 
vertical axis and increasing the cost difference does not necessarily lead to PI1. For 
very low values of E we have always full integration, for "very intermediate" values 
there are always two equilibria, and for very high values of E nonintegration always 
occurs. The region where PI1 is an equilibrium increases in the efficiency difference 
and, consequently, the likelihood of PI1 to be an equilibrium is greater.
Then consider an increase in the size of the market for final good. The firms' 
incentives to integrate are increasing in the size of the market and, accordingly, all the
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critical locuses in Figure 4.3 shift upward (see Figure 4.4). The basic effect is that the 
degree of integration increases; point A which used to be in the region of 
nonintegration is now in the region of partial integration and at point B where partial 
integration occurred the industry becomes fully integrated. By this way we can also 
select which equilibrium of the multiple ones will emerge in the process of growing 
market for the final good. Point C which was in the region of partial integration of the 
low-cost firm is now in the region of two equilibria. Because U l-D l was already 
integrated the equilibrium that will be selected is partial integration by the low-cost 
firm. However, in our model also partial integration by the high-cost firm can be an 
equilibrium. Consider point D; the integration cost is fairly high and the firms are 
almost equally efficient. Originally the industry was nonintegrated. Now, when the 
size of the market increases we come to the region of two equilibria. Because neither 
firm was originally integrated it is now possible to have an industry structure where 
only the high-cost firm integrates.
An increase in the average marginal cost of the industry decreases the firms' 
incentives to integrate. All the boundaries will shift downwards and have the same 
effects as lowering the size of the market.
We sum up the comparative static results for the industry structure in the 
following propositions.
Proposition 4.3. The degree o f integration is
(i) increasing in the size o f the downstream market,
(ii) decreasing in the integration cost, and
(iii) decreasing in the average marginal cost o f the industry.
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Proposition 4.4. The greater is the efficiency difference between the upstream firms, 
the more likely is an asymmetric industry structure where only the more efficient firm  
integrates.
4.5 Welfare
In this Section we derive the welfare maximizing industry structure. We use the 
sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus as a welfare notion (W). There are three 
sources of deadweight losses in this model: (i) Harberger triangle (final good price is 
greater than the marginal cost), (//) production inefficiency (also the high-cost upstream 
firm has positive output), and (hi) the fixed costs of integration.
In our model a vertical merger always decreases the final good price. The 
newly integrated firm obtains input at marginal cost which is lower than its Cournot 
price. This ceteris paribus decreases the final good price. However, if there remains 
an unintegrated firm in the market we have to take into account the effect of the 
merger on the input price. As was explained earlier a vertical merger lowers the input 
price which further decreases the final good price. Consequently, the social gain from 
integration is the lower final good price which reduces the Harberger triangle.
The production inefficiency is equal to {c2-c^x2 under NI and PI1 and (c2-c1)y2 
under PI2 and FI. The merger by the low-cost firm makes production allocation more 
efficient and the merger by the high-cost firm makes the production allocation less 
efficient. We can, however, show that even the merger by the high-cost firm increases 
variable welfare; the positive effect of the lower final good price outweighs the 
negative effect of less efficient production allocation. We can show that:
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Observation 4.2. W^7 < fy**12 < ^ PI1 < ^ FI where hats denote the variable (gross of 
E) values.
Proof: In Appendix 4.
Partial integration by the low-cost firm dominates partial integration by the 
high-cost firm (W7*72 < W**11). The fixed costs of integration are equal under both 
industry structures but both the final good price and the high-cost firm's output are 
lower under partial integration by the low-cost firm. Consequently, PI2 is never a 
social optimum. Variable welfare is the greater, the greater is the degree of integration 
(W*1 < f t Fn < t f f 1), but so is the sum of integration costs. Accordingly, for different 
parameter values either full integration, partial integration by the low-cost firm or 
nonintegration can be the social optimum:
Proposition 4.5. The welfare maximizing industry structure is
(i) full integration if  and only iffiF 1 - ^ PI1> E,
(ii) partial integration by the low-cost firm if  and only if  ^ FI - $ PI1 < E and ^ PI1 -
> E, and
(Hi) nonintegration if and only if  $  - < E.
Proof: In Appendix 4.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the critical locuses for both social optimum (solid line) and 
for Nash equilibrium (broken line). We show in each region the socially optimal 
structure and the Nash equilibrium structure in brackets if it is different from the 
socially optimal one. It is straightforward from Figure 4.5 that:
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Proposition 4.6. Partial integration by the low-cost upstream firm is less likely than 
what is welfare maximizing.
Proof: In Appendix 4.
When making its integration decision the firm ignores the negative externality 
for rival and the positive externality for consumers. It turns out that the first merger is 
very beneficial for the consumers and is not very harmful for the rival; the first merger 
occurs too late (in terms of growing market). The second merger does not offer a 
much lower price for the consumers but harms the rival a lot; the second merger 
emerges too early.
4.6 Nonlinear Prices
To conclude, we compare our results to those of Hart and Tirole's (1990) Model 
1 (hereafter H-T) which has nonlinear prices in the input market (essentially Bertrand 
competition). Both models have Cournot competition in the final good market. In both 
models the benefit of integration is profit sharing and there is a fixed cost of 
integration. We follow Sutton (1991) in using Cournot and Bertrand models as special 
examples within a general class of models which differ in toughness of price 
competition. Bertrand has the most severe price competition where only the most 
efficient firm can survive. Cournot corresponds to more relaxed price competition 
where also the less efficient firm has a positive market share. Our aim was to have 
predictions for the degree of integration that are robust to the toughness of price 
competition in the input market.
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H-T do not provide comparative static analysis for the industry structure but it is 
a simple matter to do that for linear demand. Figure 4.6 illustrates the equilibrium 
industry structures in their model. Competition in the input market is so severe that the 
high-cost firm cannot sell any input. Even if it integrated with a downstream firm, its 
downstream unit would buy all its input from the low-cost firm. Accordingly, high-cost 
firm does not gain anything from integration. Its incentive to integrate would be on the 
horizontal axis in Figure 4.6. The upward sloping critical locus gives the low-cost 
firm's incentive to integrate. When the firms have equal marginal costs neither firm 
has an incentive to integrate. The incentive is increasing in the efficiency difference. 
Low-cost upstream firm has an incentive for integration to restrict competition in the 
downstream market. If the low-cost supplier is unintegrated it cannot commit to supply 
one downstream firm only; excessive supply incentive arises. Integrated supplier 
internalizes this externality and can undercut its high-cost rival slightly, so that the 
unintegrated firm buys the same total amount as before but now buys from the 
integrated supplier. This increases rival's costs which has a positive horizontal effect 
on the integrated firm's profits. The equilibrium industry structure is either 
nonintegration or partial integration by the low-cost firm.
A greater market size or a lower average marginal cost will bend the critical 
locus upwards (broken line). We find that the comparative static results for the degree 
of integration are the same as in our model. The degree of integration is the greater (i) 
the greater the size of the downstream market, (ii) the lower the integration cost, and 
(hi) the lower the average marginal cost of the industry. Also, the greater is the 
efficiency difference, the more likely is an asymmetric industry structure where only 
the low-cost firm is integrated. The main point of our paper is that qualitatively the 
same pattern of integration emerges whether there is Cournot or Bertrand competition 
in the input market.
I l l
Welfare results differ. In H-T nonintegration is always the social optimum 
because integration restricts output and increases fixed costs of integration. In our 
model also an industry structure with vertical integration can be welfare maximizing 
because integration increases output although it also increases the fixed costs. H-T find 
excessive integration in Nash equilibrium and we find a less asymmetric industry 
structure than what is welfare maximizing.
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Appendix 4
We solve the nonintegrated case as an example. Full integration and partial 
integration follow in a similar manner. The profit functions of the firms are:
(A4.1) nm  = y.(a - by. - by. - px) i j  = 1,2 i*j
(A4.2) %m  = x.(px - c.) i = 1,2
To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, we work backwards and solve 
first for the equilibrium in the downstream market given the input price p^. The 
equilibrium quantities are:
(A4.3) yr ( a - Pp b
Substituting the upstream market clearing condition
(A4.4) yi + y 2 = x l + x2
into (A4.3) we can solve for the inverse demand for input; this gives the price at which 
the unintegrated downstream firms are willing to buy the input quantity supplied by the 
unintegrated upstream firms:
(A4.5) px = [2a - 3b(x7+x2)]/2.
Next we turn to examine the first stage. Inserting px from (A4.5) to (A4.2) we 
get the unintegrated upstream firm's profit expressed in terms of x.'s only:
(A4.6) nm = jc.{ [2a - 3b(Xj+x2)]/2 - c.}
The equilibrium quantities in the upstream market are thus:
(A4.7) x. = 2{a - 2c. + c.)/9b.
The equilibrium price is:
(A4.8) px = (a + cJ + c2)/3.
Finally, we can return back to the downstream market to ascertain the subgame
perfect equilibrium in terms of the exogenous parameters only. When we insert (A4.8)
into (A4.3) we get the equilibrium quantities:
(A4.9) y. = (2a - Cj - c^ 9 b
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The equilibrium price is:
(A4.10) py = [5a + 2{c1 + c j ] /9
And the equilibrium profits of the firms are:
(A 4 .ll)  kd . = (2a - Cj - c2)2/81&
(A4.12) %m  = 2(a - 2c. + c ) 2/27b
Under partial integration by Ui and Di we can solve for the equilibrium in a 
similar manner. The equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are:
(A4.13) jc. = y. = (a - 2c. + c.)/6b 
J J J v
(A4.14) y. = (5a - 7c. + 2c.)/12h
(A4.15) Px = (a + 2cf + c.)/4
(A4.16) p = (5a + 2c. + 5c.)/12 y j  i
(A4.17) nTT. = (a - 2c. + c.)2/24bUj J 1
(A4.18) nr = (a - 2c. + c.)2/366 Dj v j  r
(A4.19) n. = (5a - 7c. + 2 c )2/144ft -
And under full integration:
(A4.20) y. = (a - 2c. + c.)/3&'  i i /
(A4.21) p  = (a + c. + c.)/3
(A4.22) nr. = (a - 2c. + c.)2/%  - £  * I f
Proof of Observation 4.1:
Step 1: < jf.1
(A4.23) (a - 2c. + c f i l A b  + (a - 2c. + c.)2/366 < (a - 2c. + c.)2/9&
Simplifying
(A4.24) 3(a - 2c. + c.)2/72i> > 0
Step 2: J E ^ c / 7
(A4.25) (a - 2c. + c )2/9b < 2(a - 2c. + c )2/276 + (2a - c ; - c2)2/81£>
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Simplifying
(A4.26) [(2a - c , - c .) - \3 (a  - 2c. + c)\I9 \B  > 0
1 z  i  j
(A4.27) <=> a > [(2J 3  - l)c . - (J J  + l)c.]/(2  - J 3)
Step 3: i f '  < 8 " '
^  I  I
(A4.28) 2(a - 2c. + c.)2/27h + (2a - c; - c2)2/81& < (5a - 7c. + 2c.)2/144h
Simplifying
(A4.29) [(a-c.)(65a + 117c - 182c.) + 41(c.-c )2]/1296f> > 0
(A4.30) <= a > (182/65)c. - (117/65)c
Assumption 4.1 guarantees that (A4.24), (A4.27) and (A4.30) are satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Proof o f Proposition 4.1:
The incentives to integrate are:
(A4.31) l f U- i f '  = [(a-c )(65a - 182c. + 117c ) + 41(c.-c.)2]/12966
(A4.32) if .1- if'*  = (a - 2c. + c )2/24h
(//) the incentive is decreasing in the degree of integration: i f f  - i f 1 > i f 1- j f  V 
(A4.33) (5a - 7c. + 2c.)2/144h - 2(a - 2c. + c f / l l b  - (2a - c . + c ,)2/81i> >
I  J I J 1 2
(a - 2c. + c f /2 4 b
I  J
Simplifying
(A4.34) [(a-c.)(lla+45c.-56c) - 130(c.-c.)2]/1296& > 0
(A4.34) holds if the following conditions are satisfied:
(A4.35) 110+45^-56^ > 0 <=> a > (56/11 )c2 - (45/11)^
(A4.36) ll0+ 45c7-56c2 >65(c2-c; ) <=> a > (121/1 l)c2 - (110/1 l)c ;
(A4.37) a-Cj > 2(c^Cj) <=> a > 2c2 - c1
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Assumption 4.1 guarantees that these conditions are satisfied.
(w) the incentive is increasing in the size of the downstream market 
(A4.38) d ^ . U- jF 'yda  = (130a - 182c. + 52c.)/12966 > 0
(A4.39) d(jF'- / f i / d a  = 2(a - 2c. + cl/246  > 0
(zv) the incentive is decreasing in firm's own marginal cost 
(A4.40) iF.'ydc. = -(182a - 82c -  lOOcl/12966 < 0
(A4.41) 9{jF'- i£ lj)/dc. = -4(a - 2c. + c l/246  < 0
(v) the incentive is increasing in rival's marginal cost
(A4.42) d t f ' 1- = (52a - 100c. - 152c 1/12966 > 0
(A4.43) i f f i /d c  = 2(a - 2c. + c 1/24b > 0
(v0 the incentive is decreasing in the average marginal cost of the industry 
2
(A4.44) I d t f . ' 1- jC')/dc. = -(130a + 18c. + 52c.)/12966 < 0 
j= l 1 1 1 1 1
(A4.45) /V y d c .  = -2(a - 2c. + c.)/246 < 0
;= 1 1 1 1 1 1
(0 the more efficient firm has a greater incentive to integrate
When the firms have equal marginal costs the incentives to integrate are equal 
(equations (A4.31) and (A4.32)). Now increase c .^ (A4.40)-(A4.43) show that Ul-DFs 
incentive increases and U2-D2's incentive decreases. Therefore U l-D l's  incentive is 
greater than U2-D2's when c1 < c2.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Observation 4.2:
Step 1:
(A4.46) 2(2a - c , - c2)2/816 + 2(a - 2c; + c2)2/276 + 2(a - 2c2 + c ^ V l b
+ 2(2a-c/ -c2)2/816 < (7a - 2c; - 5 c J 2/2M b  + 5(a - 2c; + c2)2/726 
+ (5a - 7c2 + 2c; )2/1446
Simplifying
(A4.47) [(a-c;)(175a+459cr 634c2) + 199(c2-ci )2]/25926 > 0
(A4.48) <= a > (634/175)c2 -(459/175)^
Step 2: f tPI2< f t FU
Step 2(a): c f n  > c f 2 <=> pp n  < pPy12 
where CS is consumer surplus
(A4.49) (5a + 2c2 + 5cp/12 < (5a + 2cJ + 5c2)/12
(A4.50) <=> Cj < c2
Step 2(6): a f  + *£" >
(A4.51) (5a - lC j + 2c2)2/1446 + 5(a - 2c2 + c; )2/726 >
(5a - 7c2 + 2c;)2/1446 + 5(a - 2c; + c2)2/726 
(A4.52) <=> (a-c; ) > (a-c2)
Step 3:
(A4.53) (7a - 5cy - 2c2)2/2886 + (5a - 7 ^  + 2c2)2/1446 + 5(a - 2c2 + c;)2/726
< (2a - C j -  c2)2/186 + (a - 2c} + c2)2/96 + (a - 2c2 + c ;)2/96
Simplifying
(A4.54) [(a-c,)(9a+51c; -60c2) + 84(c2-c; )2]/25926 > 0
(A4.55) <= a > (60/9)c2 - (51/9)c;
Assumption 4.1 ensures that (A4.48), (A4.50), (A4.52) and (A4.55) are satisfied.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.5:
fyFl _
(A4.56) <=> c f ‘  + 7?/ + / /  + CS777 + + tS / < 2CSpn  + l / "  + 2 / / '
(A4.57) <=> (2a-  Cj -  c ^ lW )  + (a - 2 c; + c ^ B b  + (a - 2c2 + cy)2/96 +
2(2a - Cj - c2f / S l b  + 2(a - 2cy + c ^ /T lb  + 2(a - 2c2 + cy)2/276 + 
2(2a-cy-c2)2/81* < 2(7a - 5c; - 2c2)2/2886 + 2(5a - 7cy + 2c2)2/1446 +
10(a - 2c2 + c / n 2 b
Simplifying
(A4.58) [47(a - cy)2 + 316(c2 - cy)(a - c2) + 96(c2 - cy)(a - 2c2 + cy)]/25926 > 0
Q.E.D
Proof of Proposition 4.6:
Step 1: r 7 - < i f /  - * " 7
(A4.59) <=> c / 7 + 7 f / + l f / - CS™ - ?t"7 - t t f  < $£7 - / / ‘
(A4.60) <=> C f  + $ 1  < CSPn + i f / 1
(A4.61) <=> (2a - cj - c ^ / U b  + (a - 2cy + c ^ B b
< ( la  - 5cj  - 2c2)2/2886 + (5a - 7c; + 2c2)2/1446
Simplifying
(A4.62) [(a-cy)(475a-135c; -340c2) - 212(c2-cy)2]/2592& > 0
True if the following conditions are satisfied:
(A4.63) 475a-135c7-340c2 > 0  <=> a > (135/475)c; + (340/475)c2
(A4.64) 475a-135Cj-340c2 > 212(c2-c7) <=> a > (552/475)c2 - (77/475)c;
(A4.65) a-Cj > c^Cj <=> a > c2
Assumption 4.1 guarantees that these conditions are satisfied.
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Step 2: ¥ U- V?1 > S™- if /
(A4.66) <=> CS™ + if /1 + i f /1 - Of” - i f / - f / >  i f / 1- J?
(A4.67) <=> O f11 + if /1 > CS"1 + if /
(A4.68) <=> ( la  - 5cy - 2c2)2/2886 + 5(a + cy - 2c2)2/72b >
2(2a - Cy - c2)2/81i» + 2(a + c; - 2 c J 2n i b  + (2a - c; - c2)2/81& 
(A4.69) <=> [45(a-Cy)2 + 108(c2-cy)(a-c2) + 72(c2-cy)(a-c; )]/2592i> > 0
Q.E.D.
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5 Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration 
and Product Market Competition
5.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been renewed interest in the possible anti-competitive 
effects of vertical mergers. In particular attention has focused on the possibility that 
integration will result in the foreclosure of nonintegrated rivals i.e the restriction of 
buyers' access to suppliers and/or suppliers' access to buyers. Clearly in order to 
analyse such questions the precise effects of integration decisions, and the competitive 
environment within which firms operate must be considered in detail. In this paper we 
will adopt an incomplete contracts/optimal control rights approach to integration. 
Further, we will explicitly model the effect of varying the degree of market 
competition. This approach enables us to consider the nature of and motives for 
foreclosure. We will also consider the decisions firms make with regard to 
specialisation i.e. will a group of assets be assembled to concentrate on selling the final 
product, to specialise in input production or to combine both tasks.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) we will assume that ownership confers 
residual control rights. If an agent owns an asset then he/she makes the decisions 
regarding the use of that asset, except where such decision powers are granted to others 
through contractual agreements. In a complex world where it may be difficult to verify 
or even write the clauses of a complete contract the allocation of ownership rights will 
therefore be important.
As an example suppose that an agent can work on a machine, and by doing so 
improve its performance. If a contract rewarding the agent for his/her effort or for the
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performance improvement could be written then we might expect such an agreement to 
be drawn up between the agent and the factory owner. The agent would put in the 
effort and the owner would benefit from an improved machine. However, if 
agreements cannot be written then once the agent has overhauled the machine he can 
be sacked, without compensation. As a result the worker will not exert any effort. An 
obvious solution to this problem would be to give the worker the ownership rights to 
the machine. However then the factory owner must negotiate with the agent for use of 
the machine. In turn this may dull the owner's incentives to find new markets for the 
product, since the machine-owning worker can capture some of the benefits. The 
various ownership structures thus have costs and benefits. Which structure dominates 
depends on the relative sizes of these two effects. If the maintenance worker is pretty 
ineffective we might expect the factory owner to control the machine. On the other 
hand if maintenance is crucial the worker will own the machine.
Now suppose that another firm, selling in a separate market desires the 
machine's product. This will tend to further encourage worker ownership of the 
machine. The dulled incentives of the factory owner are now offset by extra benefits to 
a high performance machine, through external sales.
But what if the other firm competes against the factory in the downstream 
market? Then selling the machine output to the rival allows it to concentrate on 
competing in the downstream market. (Assume the rival has other less efficient supply 
sources available, and so does not fully rely on the machine operator.) In contrast, the 
factory owner's incentives are dulled and it will suffer in a competitive market. If 
competition on the downstream market is weak the gains from intermediate output 
trade outweigh the adverse effects on the final good market. However, as competition 
gets tougher it may pay to transfer the machine to the factory owner. Machine output
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is of course inferior, but the external buyer suffers too. In addition the factory owner 
has improved incentives to fight on the downstream market, since he/she no longer has 
to negotiate for access to the machine. If competition on the final good market gets 
really tough then it offers little attraction. In which case it may be best to effectively 
withdraw from the final market and concentrate on intermediate good production. This 
can be achieved by giving the agent ownership of the machine. Industry profits are 
then shared between the input producer and the remaining downstream firm. There is 
therefore a non-monotonic relationship between ownership allocation and competition.
The above example provides a flavour of our results. Broadly we see greater 
upstream ownership of assets (nonintegration) when the upstream worker is 
important/effective. We also observe a non-monotonic relationship between ownership 
structure and the toughness of competition.
There are two lines of literature on vertical integration that we intend to bring 
together. The first one takes the view that different units of the firm are run by 
separate managers who are self interested and cannot be made to act in the best interest 
of the firm because of incompleteness of contracts.34 The importance of a manager's 
investment is a major determinant for the optimal allocation of ownership. In these 
papers the issue of product market competition is not raised. The second branch of 
literature concentrates on the effect of integration on product market competition and 
explores the possibility of foreclosure.35 These papers assume that integration leads to
3 4 G r o s s m a n  a n d  H a r t  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  H a r t  a n d  M o o r e  ( 1 9 9 0 )  a n d  B o l t o n  a n d  W h i n s t o n  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .
3 5 V i c k e r s  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  B o n n a n o  a n d  V i c k e r s  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  S a l i n g e r  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  H a r t  a n d  T i r o l e  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  O r d o v e r ,  
S a l o n e r  a n d  S a l o p  ( 1 9 9 0 )  a n d  G a l - O r  ( 1 9 9 2 ) .
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profit sharing and removes all the conflicts of interest inside the firm.36 Integration 
structure is used as a device to gain competitive advantage in the downstream market 
by changing industry cost structure. Our paper has elements from both strands of 
literature. We provide an explicit treatment of the internal organisation of the firm in 
the strategic context of a competitive environment. The key determinants for the 
optimal allocation of ownership rights in our paper are the relative importance of 
managers' efforts and the toughness of competition in the product market.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) and Helper and Levine (1992) are also related to 
our paper. Holmstrom and Tirole examine transfer pricing problem in the context of 
organizational choice. In a decentralized firm the units are allowed to trade externally 
and bargain over the transfer price. The price will then reflect the quality and thus give 
the managers good incentives for quality enhancement. On the other hand the external 
trade may draw excess attention and deter relationship-specific investments. The 
optimal degree of decentralization is determined by this trade-off. In our model the 
vertical supply decision is part of the organizational choice. Helper and Levine 
examine the effect of product market competition in transaction cost model. They 
show that downstream firms with oligopoly rents may prefer inefficient arm's-length 
supplier relations to long-term contracts, if that reduces the ability of the supplier to 
bargain for a share of the oligopoly rents. In our paper a downstream manager may 
buy up an upstream unit and so make its input inefficient to increase his share of 
oligopoly rent relative to the other downstream firm. Helper and Levine assume that 
oligopoly rent is fixed while in our model it depends on the toughness of competition 
and on the managers' investments.
3 6 B o l t o n  a n d  W h i n s t o n  ( 1 9 9 1 )  c o m p a r e  t h e s e  t w o  a p p r o a c h e s  a n d  i n  p a r t ic u la r  t h e  p a p e r s  b y  H a r t  a n d  
T i r o l e  ( 1 9 9 0 )  a n d  B o l t o n  a n d  W h i n s t o n  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .
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The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the 
model. In Section 5.3 we present some useful preliminary results. This prepares us for 
Section 5.4 where payoff functions and investment incentives are examined. Finally 
industry ownership structure is analysed in Section 5.5.
5.2 The Model
We consider two upstream assets, U1 and U2, and two downstream assets, D1 
and D2. The upstream assets produce input which is used by the downstream units to 
produce the final good. All technologies are constant returns to scale and one unit of 
input makes one unit of final good. Both input and final good production is costless.
Each unit is operated by a manager. Before production takes place the manager 
of a unit can increase the value of its output by exerting effort. If the manager of Di 
chooses effort level J. then the unit value added in final good production is v(/.). 
Similarly if the manager of Ui chooses effort level / .  then the unit value of input is 
v(I.)/k, where A: is a measure of the relative effectiveness of upstream effort.
Assumption 5.1. v(I.)fk = IJk and v(J.) = /
The cost of investment to the manager is:
Assumption 5.2. c(I.) = f i  and c(J.) = f i  where /3 >> 0.
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Once a manager has expended effort in value-enhancing investment he/she can 
be replaced costlessly for the remaining stages of production, that is the owner can hire 
an equally capable manager to take care of the production.
In line with the previous literature on incomplete contracts we assume that the 
effort requirements are too complex to be described adequately in a contract. As a 
result effort levels are chosen non-cooperatively. It is for this reason that inefficiencies 
can arise and the allocation of ownership rights matters in our model. Contractual 
incompleteness means that any compensation a manager receives for his effort must 
occur after the effort has been undertaken. We also assume that it is very difficult to 
describe the required input characteristics ex ante. Therefore the input trade too is ex 
ante noncontractible. We also rule out profit-sharing agreements.
Ex ante contracts can however be written on the allocation of ownership rights. 
Amongst the rights ownership confers is the power to hire and fire managers. The 
ownership of the assets Ui and Di is allocated between the initial managers of the 
upstream and downstream units. The managers of Ui and Di allocate ownership rights 
to maximize their joint profits given the ownership structure of Uj-Dj. As a 
considerable simplification we will consider the following industry configurations:
(0 partial integration (PI); one set of assets (U2JD2) is owned by a downstream 
manager and the second set of assets (U1J)1) is owned separately, and
(ii) integration (I); both sets of assets are owned by a downstream manager.
Industry structure is therefore determined by UI and D l's  integration decision.
Assumption 5.3. k > 1.
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This assumption ensures that a given level of effort is more effective in 
increasing value when applied during final good production as opposed to input 
production. It is consistent with our focus on downstream control.
Ex post the uncertainty about the required characteristics of input is resolved 
and the owners of upstream and downstream assets negotiate a spot contract on the 
procurement of input. The contract will take the form of a two part tariff. Input will 
be exchanged at price zero, while the fixed fee negotiated will depend on the
bargaining power of the parties. Also the bargaining on the non-owning manager's
compensation for effort takes place ex post.
Assumption 5.4. Internally sourced input can be utilised fo r  internal production only.
Assumption 5.4 is made for convenience. In a more complete model that 
includes firms' technology choices (specific or general) we could derive this assumption 
as a result.
Ultimately, production of final good occurs and the firms compete in the 
downstream market. We assume that total demand is 1, and this is allocated between 
the two downstream firms according to the values of their products, and the degree of 
market competition. The profits of the downstream firms are given by:
(5.1) %m  = 7T.(v.,v^p) for i j  = 1,2 i * j
where the product values are v. and v. and p is the degree of competition, 0 < p < p. 
When p = 0 there is no competition; each firm is a monopoly in its half of the market.
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Assumption 5.5. n,/v.,v.;0) = vJ2
We further assume:
Assumption 5.6. For p  > 0
(i) dnJdv. > 0 and d2 nJdv2 < 0' 7 i i i i
(ii) dnJdv, < 0
1 3
(iii) d2nJdv.dv. < 0' 7 i i j
(iv) d2 nJdv2 - d 2 nJdv.dv. < 0.
' 7 i i  i i j
The assumption that the marginal value of investment is decreasing in the value of 
rival's product does not imply anything about the strategies in the final good market. 
This assumption can hold both with price competition (strategic complements) and 
quantity competition (strategic substitutes).
Assumption 5.7.
(i) For v. < Vj dnJdp < 0, dnJdp < d itjdp , d2nJdvdp > 0 and d2nJdv.dp < 
d2 nJdvdp.
(ii) For v. = v. dnJdp < 0 and d2nJdvdp  > 0.
Assumption 5.7 says that the low-value firm suffers from an increase in 
competition while the high-value firm may gain (its market share is higher but unit 
margin is lower). Also, the marginal value of the investment is increasing in the degree 
of competition for the high-value firm. Competition lowers the profit but enhances the 
marginal incentives to invest for firms whose product values are equal.
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As described above the firm's profit is its market share times the unit margin 
(since the size of the market is one). In general it is sufficient to give structure to this 
total profit term but we shall make one assumption regarding the unit margin, p
Assumption 5.8. At p = 0 dfiJdp = -y where y  > 0.
Introducing a little competition to monopoly markets results in an equal drop in unit 
margins for both firms.
The time line of the game is:
Ex ante
i------------------------ 1—
contract on managers
ownership choose
e ffo r ts
Note that all the actions are observable. When the managers choose effort levels they 
know the ownership structure of the competing vertical structure. Bargaining over the 
procurement of the input and effort compensation occurs under symmetric information: 
effort levels are observable (but not verifiable). Finally, the downstream managers 
know rival's input purchases when they make their pricing decisions.
Ex post
s p o t  contract 
on input trade 
and e ffo r t  
com pensation
p rodu ct ion  o f  
in p u t
produc t i on 
of  f i n a l  good
compe t i t io n  
in  th e down-  
st ream market
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5.3 Preliminary Results
In this Section we derive a useful set of results that form a basis for the analysis 
of the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 5.1.
A non-owning manager will receive no compensation fo r his effort and as a result will 
undertake no effort.
Since contracts contingent on effort cannot be written ex ante the manager must 
be rewarded after effort has been made. However once effort is made its value is sunk 
in the asset The manager can therefore be sacked by the owner at no cost. As a result 
the manager will not be rewarded for the initial effort (unless he/she also owns the 
asset). Foreseeing no reward a non-owning manager will therefore make no investment 
in effort. Since /^ = 0 we can simplify notation by defining I  = I y
If a downstream firm Di can only be supplied by an independent upstream firm 
UI the bargaining will result in an even split of the surplus:
(5.2) Rd. = Rul = 7t[v(/p+v(/),v.;p]/2 for i j  = 1,2 i * j
where di is Di's owner, ul is Ul's owner and R is the revenue.
If a downstream firm D i is supplied internally by an upstream unit it owns then 
the owner keeps all the surplus:
(5.3) = * .[* /.) ,V4P]
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Proposition 5.1 tells that the non-owning manager makes no effort and therefore the 
value of the final good manufactured from internal input is the value of the downstream 
investment only (since v(0) = 0).
Finally if a downstream firm D i can obtain input either internally or from an 
independent supplier UI then the profit shares are given by:
The gains from external over internal sourcing are shared by the downstream firm and 
the independent upstream supplier.
Since there are no capacity constraints on firms' output and exclusive dealing 
contracts are not enforceable an independent upstream firm cannot commit to serve one 
downstream firm only. Having dealt with one downstream firm on an exclusive basis it 
has every incentive to trade with its rival - given that input is traded in spot exchanges 
before final good sales occur. During bargaining each downstream firm will foresee 
that its rival will also have access to the high-quality input and will negotiate the 
upstream firm's fee accordingly.
Proposition 5.2.
Under partial integration the independent upstream firm (UI) will supply both 
downstream firms. As a result it will receive revenue:
(5.4)
(5.5)
Rd i= 0 1'[v(/ ,)+v(/ )-v/;p] + ff[v(/.),v.;p] }/2 
Rul = - tf,-[>(/.),v.;p] }/2
R ui =  W V /2 +
where v} = v(Jj) + v(I), v2 = v(J2) + v(I) and v2 = v (/2).
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Assumption 5.4 ensures that under integration both firms will source input internally.
We are now in a position to calculate the payoffs for the managers under the 
two possible ownership regimes.
Partial Integration (PI):
With a partially integrated industry structure there are three independent firms - 
the separate upstream and downstream firms UI and D I, and the integrated 
downstream firm D2. The payoffs for the owners are given by:
where v; = v ( /p  + v(7), v2 = v(/2) + v(7) and v2 = v(/2).
Under the partial integration regime the independent upstream firm, U I , receives half 
of DV s profits. Since D I  has no alternative source of input bargaining results in this 
50:50 split. UI also receives half of its contribution to the profits of the integrated 
downstream firm, D2. If D2 fails to come to an agreement with UI it can source input 
from its own (inefficient) upstream plant. UI and D2 therefore bargain over the 
incremental contribution of the superior input and again share the gains 50:50. D2
5.4 Manager Payoffs and Effort Incentives
5.4.1 Payoff Functions
(5.6)
(5.7)
(5.8)
nui = ki(v1 ’v2 ’P^2 + lx2(vr v2-,p) - 7T2(v; ,v2;p)]/2 - c(I)
*dl = Jr/ v/ ’v2;p^2 ' c (/P  
Kd2 = [ , 2(V 2 ;<,) + * 2 < V 2 ;P)]/2 ’ C(j2>
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receives the average of the revenues generated with and without t/7's superior input. 
Since contracts contingent on effort cannot be written, bargaining for input takes place 
after effort has been expended. As a result each party bears the full cost of its own 
investment.
Integration (I):
In the integrated setting there are only two firms. Each downstream manager 
also controls an upstream plant. Payoffs for the owners are given by:
(5.9) nd. = Jr.(v.,v.;p) - c(7.) i  = 1,2
where v. = v(J.).
I  v  V
Since there are no independent upstream producers each downstream firm must 
source its input needs internally. Given that non-owning upstream managers do not 
exert effort these inputs are of basic, unenhanced quality. However the downstream 
owner-managers have free access to input and as a result retain all the revenues 
generated by their sales.
For the remainder of the analysis we will drop the arguments of the profit
functions and let k . = K.(v.yv ;p )  and H. = 7t.(y.,v;p).i r  i f r /  i r  i j r /
5.4.2 Incentives to Invest
Each party's incentives to invest in effort are determined by the above payoff 
functions. Where a manager receives all revenue increments generated by his or her 
effort incentives are maximised, while if the revenues are shared incentives to invest
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are diluted too. Each manager will choose an effort level such that the marginal cost of 
extra effort (borne solely by the manager) is equated with the marginal returns of extra 
effort to that manager. Below we list these relations for each ownership structure.
Partial Integration (PI):
(5.10) Ml:
1
’dn2 d ll' dn2
+ :
+ ^ .
-5*7 3 ?  -* o
An increase in effort by ul raises the value of the input used by D I and D2, and 
hence the value of the final products. Since ul must negotiate with a buyer its 
contribution to profits will be shared 50:50 with the downstream firm. With greater 
effort by the upstream manager the value of D l's  product rises which will tend to 
increase its revenues. However the improved input is also used by D l's  rival on the 
downstream market, D2, yielding a counteracting negative effect on D l's  profits. 
Clearly the scale of this negative effect will depend on the degree of competition in the 
downstream market. If competition is weak then increases in the value of D2's product 
have very little effect on D l's  profits, and vice versa. If competition is strong the 
negative effects will be quite considerable. Similar forces are at work in the impact of 
increased upstream investment on D2's profits. The first two big terms inside the curly 
brackets show that ul takes into account the effect on half the industry profit. However 
if D2 were to utilise its internal input source it would not benefit from greater Ul 
effort. Indeed profits would be reduced by the improvements in competing D l's 
product Thus greater effort by ul will weaken D2's internal sourcing option thereby 
increasing u l's share of the benefits of trade (the last term inside curly brackets).
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dx  v'(J )
(5.11) dl: = c V j)
When dl exerts greater effort it increases its profits. Given the bargaining for input 
with U l, d l receives half of its marginal contribution which it equates with the 
marginal cost of extra investment in effort.
(5.12) d2:
dn2 dw2 W 2)
By investing in more effort d2 not only increases its revenues, but it also increases its 
share of these revenues (by raising the value of internal sourcing). Both these effects 
have a half weighting in determining d2's effort.
Let the efforts of ul, dl and d2 in the partial integration case be denoted by IPI, 
JPI and JPI respectively.
Integration (I):
d%.
(5.13) di: ^ v ’(/.) = c'(/.) i = l,2
i
Under the integrated regime each downstream firm must source input internally. 
However the absence of external deals and the resultant bargaining means that each 
downstream manager keeps the full incremental value of an extra unit of effort.
We will denote dl and d2's investments in the integrated case by and 
respectively.
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Nash equilibrium in investments is determined by the first order conditions
(5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) under partial integration and by (5.13) under integration. Our 
assumptions ensure that a unique equilibrium in investments exists for both structures.
From these effort equations we can already observe some of the trade-offs that 
the different ownership structures present. Under the integrated regime downstream 
managers keep all of the gains from extra effort, but lose out on the benefits of 
upstream investment. With a partially integrated industry structure firms benefit from 
upstream investment increasing the value of the products, but the returns from extra 
effort for the downstream managers are diluted. Of course the precise nature of these 
trade offs will depend on the relative value of upstream investment, and on the 
influence of competition on the downstream market. These factors will be considered 
further below. First it will prove useful to examine investment incentives when there is 
no competition i.e. p = 0.
5.4.3 No Competition Case
When there is no competition on the product market the profits of each 
downstream firm are unaffected by the value of the rivals output. Market share for 
each firm is set at 1/2 and the unit margin depends only on own value. As a result the 
effort equations have a particularly simple form.
Partial Integration (PI):
(5.14) « :  t p  -
(5.15) dl: ^  = c’C /f)
(5.16) d2: C'{f < )
U l serves the whole market (=1) and the contribution of its effort increment to 
the unit margins (y \ f  !)/k) is shared 50:50 with the relevant downstream firm. D l  has 
a market of 1/2 and receives half the increment to unit value. D2 too has a market of 
1/2 but keeps the full revenue increment of its extra effort (v'(T^7)) since it can realise 
this by sourcing internally.
In the absence of strategic effects we clearly see that D2's internal sourcing 
option ensures its manager exerts more effort than D l.  m i 's  effort level depends on k, 
the measure of the relative value of upstream investment. When k is large an 
investment in upstream effort has little value. Consequently there is little return on 
such investments, and upstream effort will be low. When k is low upstream effort is 
highly productive and large rewards ensure high effort levels.
Integration (I):
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With an integrated structure the downstream firms (with market share = 1/2) 
each receive the full benefit to their revenues of increased effort, thus maximising their 
incentives. Symmetry ensures that the effort levels of both downstream firms are 
identical. Note that for p = 0 d2's investment is the same under both industry 
ownership configurations.
Proposition 5.3.
When there is no competition between the downstream firms (p = 0) then investment by 
the owner o f the integrated downstream firm (D2) is identical under integrated and 
partially integrated structures. In addition it is identical to the effort investment made 
by D l in the integrated regime i.e.
We are now in a position to consider the equilibrium industry ownership 
structure.
5.5 Industry Ownership Structure
In the context of our simple model the equilibrium industry ownership structure 
is determined by the integration decision of U l and D l.  If assets U l and D l  are jointly 
controlled the industry will be fully integrated, while if U l and D l  are independently 
controlled the industry will be partially integrated (since by assumption assets U2 and 
D2 are always jointly owned). The initial owners of U l and D l  allocate control of the 
upstream and downstream assets to maximise their joint profits. The joint profits under 
each ownership regime are given below:
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(5.19)
(5.20)
We are particularly interested in the dependence of industry structure on two 
key parameters - the effectiveness of upstream effort (k) and the degree of product 
market competition (p). The locus of points separating the Integrated and Partially 
Integrated regions of our parameter space is therefore the set of (k,p) combinations 
where ul-dl profits under the two ownership structures are equal. In plotting this 
critical locus it will prove useful to begin at the point where p  = 0 i.e. when there is no 
competition between the downstream firms.
Proposition 5.4.
Suppose that p  = 0 i.e. there is no competition between the downstream firms. Then 
there exists a % such that fo r k >Tc the industry will be integrated, while fo r k <Tc the 
industry will be partially integrated.
Proof:
The difference between ul and dl's joint profits under the integrated and partially 
integrated regimes is given by the following term:
From the effort incentive equations of the previous section
(5.22) ^v(/') - c (j\)  > - c ( f / )  > 0
Also if k = 1
(5.23) jv (/W) - c(IPI) = - c ( f ‘) = - c ( / j )
and as k «
(5.24) ^ v i f )  - c(IPI) 0
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*£ m i ■ ^u'l-dl > °- By continuity 
Q.E.D.
The economic intuition for this result is quite simple. The value of allocating 
ownership and hence control of the upstream asset to its manager is the enhanced 
incentive that manager then has to exert effort. This raises the value of D l's  product 
and also results in input sales to D2 , each of which generates additional profits. The 
disadvantage of separation of control of upstream and downstream assets is due to the 
dilution of manager dl's effort incentives. The benefits of his/her increased effort must 
then be shared with an input supplier. When the value of upstream investment is high 
(k low) the benefits of ul effort through higher product value and external sales 
outweigh the weakening of dl's incentives. However when k is high the value of u l's 
investment will be low, leading to a small contribution to product value and low 
revenue from external sales. In this situation control of both upstream and downstream 
assets should be concentrated in the hands of the downstream manager, maximising 
his/her incentives to exert greater effort.
As we increase the degree of competition between the downstream firms this 
general pattern will continue with the integrated structure being preferred by ul and dl 
when k is high and the non-integrated structure dominating when k is low. However 
the value of k where the agents are indifferent between integration and non-integration 
will in general vary as the degree of competition is increased. It is to this relationship 
that we now turn.
We have already determined that when p  = 0 ul and dl are indifferent between 
integrated and non-integrated structures when k = Tc. Which structure dominates
Hence for k = 1 % . .. - n  . < 0 and for k largeu l - d l  u l - d l  °
there is a k = Tc such that ,, = 0.u l - d l  u l - d l
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however when we increase p i.e. we introduce product market competition?
There are several factors that we might expect to influence this. Firstly if  D l  
has the higher value product then we might expect its market share to increase as 
competition increases. On the other hand if D2 has the better product then we would 
expect D l's  market share to be squeezed. In addition an increase in competition is 
likely to squeeze margins. Of course even if D l's  market share does contract we would 
expect an offsetting benefit from t/7's increased sales to D2.
It will be useful to begin by considering the relative values of D2 and D l's  
products at p = 0 and k = Tc.
Proposition 5.5.
At p  = 0 and k - k  the following relationships between product values hold:
(i) v”  > v”  > vP/  and 
d o  v ' = v;.
Proof:
(0  At p = 0 and k = k> n?  ^ dl = if j j  dl implies that
(5.25) \ v ( j \ ) - c ( j\  ) = \ v ( . / f ) + 5_v(/") - c ( f / )  - c(IFl)
t^/C
But from Proposition 5.3: /J  =
Hence \ v ( f j )  - c ( f j )  = + l~ V{IPI) - c ( / / )  - c ( f ) .
Re-arranging:
(5.26) v(f2l) - v ( f / )  - - l \v { f2l) - c (j" )])
+ A[\v(IPI) - c ( f ) ]
Now from the profit maximising effort conditions:
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(5.27) j v i f / )  - c(JPI) > \v ( /2‘) - c(f2'); and
(5.28) jv(IP') - c(IPI) > 0 
Therefore v ( f j )  > v i/^ )  + v ( f ‘)fk
(ii) From Proposition 5.3: J1. = jL  It follows immediately that v (J j ) = v(J2 ).
Q.E.D.
Consider the set of parameter values such that there is no competition (p = 0) 
and ul and dl are indifferent between integration and separation (k = Tc) i.e. we are at 
the point in parameter space where the critical boundary between Integrated and 
Partially Integrated regimes cuts the k axis (see Figure 5.1). Then at this point the 
values of the integrated firms' products are identical (as they are everywhere) while the 
value of D2's product (even when using internally sourced input) under the partially 
integrated regime exceeds the value of D l's  product (using the efficient independent 
supplier).
From the above result, when U l and D l  are non-integrated we would expect D2 
to increasingly dominate the market as competition increases. On the other hand when 
U l and D l  are integrated the values of the two downstream products are the same and 
hence both firms will maintain a market of 1/2 (though increasing competition will 
reduce margins).
This leads to our main result.
Proposition 5.6.
The relationship between k and p along the critical boundary between the Integrated 
(I) and Partially Integrated (PI) regions o f parameter space is non-monotonic. Initially 
as p  increases from 0 1c falls, while fo r  high values o f p ic  is increasing in p.
143
P
Figure 5.1
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Proof: In Appendix 5.
Again the economic intuition is simple. Suppose we begin from the point p  = 
0 and k = Tc. At this point ul and dl are indifferent between integration and 
non-integration. When non-integrated the value of D l's  product is lower than that of 
D 2t due to its weaker incentives to perform value-enhancing effort. As competition 
increases therefore the less efficient upstream-downstream combination (JJ1-D1) is 
squeezed by U1-D2. In addition since k is relatively high Ul's contribution to D2's 
profits is low, and so its share of the gains is small. When integrated U l and D l  lose 
these small revenues from input sales to D2, but D l  is put on an equal footing with D2 
on the downstream market and hence is squeezed less by increased competition. 
Therefore with k = Tc and p  small the integrated structure dominates. At even stronger 
levels of competition however the asymmetric structure re-emerges. Tough 
competition results in considerable dissipation of profits under the symmetric structure, 
with both downstream firms integrated with input suppliers. Both downstream 
managers make high investments but since they are equal market share stays at 1/2. At 
p  = p  all the profits are dissipated under the symmetric structure. In contrast if D l  and 
U l separate U l can always make a positive profit by supplying a downstream firm. A  
likely scenario is the one where separation effectively eliminates D l  on the final good 
market and gives D2 a dominant position, but this is more than compensated for by the 
(admittedly small) supplier profits accruing to UL  Thus for strong levels of 
competition the non-integrated structure dominates for U l and D L  Rather than being 
grouped towards head to head competition in the downstream market assets are more 
advantageously organised to emphasise the buyer-supplier relationship.
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This result is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The critical level of k that separates the 
Integrated and Partially Integrated regions of our parameter space initially falls as p is 
increased from 0 (since an integrated structure is increasingly attractive for U l and 
D l), but as p rises further the separated structure becomes more and more attractive 
leading to the dominance of the Partially Integrated industry structure and a rise in the 
critical value Tc.
Briefly we can compare the above results with the structures that maximise 
producer surplus and overall welfare.
Proposition 5.7.
When there is no competition between downstream firms (p = 0) there exists a range of  
values o f k such that the equilibrium industry ownership structure does not maximise 
producer (and hence total) surplus. Within this parameter range integration by U l and 
D l results in inefficient foreclosure o f D2's input source.
Proof:
When p = 0 both downstream firms are monopolists so consumer surplus = 0. Hence
overall welfare is maximised when producer surplus is maximised.
By definition, at p = 0 and k = Tc: i f 1. = n?. ...J  u l - d l  u l - d l
From Proposition 5.3: f *  = J1.
Therefore: a "  = v (^ 7) + \ v { f l) - c (f2') > v(/7) - c(j[)  = ^
Define k such that when p = 0 and k = k: ,, + j f . i  = i i . + ij?„r  u l - d l  d 2  u l - d l  d 2
A  ^
By continuity k > k.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for this result is again straightforward. When ul and dl choose an 
integrated structure they consider only their own joint profits. However when
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integration occurs D2 loses an efficient input supplier, and its profits fall. Since U l 
only receives half of the extra revenues generated for D2 by the superior input ul and 
dl fail to consider the other 50% of the benefits (accruing to d2)y when making their 
integration decision. Integration thus imposes an externality on d2 through the 
foreclosure of its most attractive input source. Since producers capture all the surplus 
in the no competition setting, an inefficient ownership structure from a producer view 
is also inefficient in terms of overall welfare maximisation. (Note that with our 
demand structure there are no inefficient demand effects generated by monopoly).
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Appendix 5
Proposition A5.1
At p  = 0 the changes in ul and di’s efforts induced by increased competition will be 
small i.e.
d ^ /d p , dJ^/ldp < e 
where e is very small.
Proof:
At p = 0 the changes in investment are simply:
(A5.1)
(A5.2)
d f
w
• - \2  n 2  - 2  " 2  * 2 —
o It j  a 71 j  cT it 2 u K 2 2
dv ~dp + dv^dp + dv~dp + dv ~dp dv~dp /P(P-i )fl-2
d f 1 (P'K.I
dv dp
P »  0 implies that these terms are very small.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.6:
We shall proceed in 2 stages. First we show that for p  large and k = Tc n?ul dl< d l. 
Second we prove that d(/z^ - dl)/dp > 0 at p = 0 and k = k.
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Step 1: for p large and k = k i f . ,.<ul-dl ul-dl
(la) Define p such that = 0. p exists since:
7T. ( 7 T . . - / T . . )
<A5-3> r r r V f > 0F 11 22 1221
duf dlt. dllj dji
<A 5 ‘4 > ^ V  +  ^ V,(7V < 0
C^TT. ^  7T. „  d ^ n .
where %  = *u = -C,,(/P and KV = ^ k [ v,(/p] • P is the
1 i 1 J
upperbound for p in our analysis. This ensures that payoff functions are continuous.
For p > p only one manager can invest and make nonnegative profit.
(lb ) nT*l dl > 0 for p = p and k = Tc
There are four possible scenarios for downstream investments and we analyse each of 
them in turn.
(0 Suppose J^1 = J^1 = 0 is an equilibrium. If IPI = 0 then the products have no value 
and / '  = 0. I f 0 < / " < / t h e n  / '  = - c(IPI) > * .[> (/) ,v (/);p ] -
c ( f  ) = 0. Therefore f  = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose > 0 and JPI = 0 is an equilibrium. This implies that = 
^(v^,v2;p)/2 - c(JPI) > 0 and n^v^v^p) > 0. For very small I  (at negligible cost since 
c \0) = 0) / '  i> Kj(y^v^p)l2  > 0. Therefore f 1 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
(in) Suppose JPI = 0 and JP^  > 0 is an equilibrium. This implies that ^ (v^ v^ p )  > 0.
For very small I  (at negligible cost) ^  > 0. Therefore f l -  0 cannot be
an equilibrium.
(iv) Suppose JPI > 0 and > 0 is an equilibrium. This implies that /r.(v.,K;p) > 0 for
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i = 1,2. For very small I  (at negligible cost) if^  > 7T^ (v^ ,v2;p)/2 > 0. Therefore IPI = 0 
cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 2: A t p  = 0 ,k  = % > 0.
Under integration introducing competition has the following effect:
(A5.5)
dn!, dn.ul-dl 1
Ip
dn dJ 
3p“  + 3 v^v'( / 2)3p ’  +
dn
w : v’(J i ) ' C’^ V
Given the first order condition (5.13) and the assumption that dnjch^  = 0 at p = 0 we 
have:
K i - d i  d * i < y r v r W(A5.6) dp dp < 0
Under partial integration the changes in payoffs are:
dn
(A5.7)
d / 'ul 1 dn, i  dn2 1 ^ * 2  i 
Ip  Z ^ "  + Z 3 j r ' Z 3 j r  + 2
dn2 3n2 
d v , d v , ' d v ,,
9J.
djtj dn  ^ 3k2
W-2 + x r2 '* r 2J
K 'l _ 1 **1 1
dp 1  dp 2
’dn. d n '
d J . d / \  d l  
V'(-J2)d p ' + W L dp
d l  1 dn.l dJ0 dlf!. dJj
v'{I)dp + J W 2 v'(72)3p“ + d J J d p '(A5.8)
Given the first order condition (5.10), (5.11) and Proposition A5.1 we are left with:
K L i  ^ / v; ' ' V ° )  i ^ 7’vt /;°)  i ^ 2 7’V ° >(A5.9)
Therefore
Ip W W ~dp
, * «  m \  _  d K i { v \  ' v r 0 )  ^ , ( v 7 ' v 7 ^  1 ^ 2 ( / 2  ,VP/ ; Q )
(a d .iu; --------^ ----------------------^ -----------------^ ---------- j  "~dp ~dp dp
1 ^ 7’v>
2 dp
"3p
It is easiest to determine the sign of (A5.10) diagrammatically. Diagram (a) in 
Figure A5.1 represents the change in D l 's profits in the integrated case (the first term 
in equation (A5.10)). Since dl and d2's efforts are identical there is no change in 
market share (=1/2) when competition increases. There is however a fall in profits due
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(a) dn
(6>) dn II
(c) d Z
B2
1/2
1/2
Hi
(c o d l f
1/2 1 
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to the reduced margin D l  enjoys. This is represented by area A.
Turning to diagram (b). This represents the change in D l's  profits under the
Partial Integration regime (the second term in (A5.10)). Here the fall in profits is due
PI PInot only to the shrinking margin but also due to the fall in market share (v  ^ < v2 ).
Diagram (c) represents the change in D2's profits when it utilises the efficient 
input supplied by U1 (the third term in (A5.10)). There is a gain in market share (C2) 
but a fall in unit margins (C l).
Finally diagram (d) represents the change in D2's profits if it were to use its 
internal sourcing option under the Partial Integration regime (the fourth term in 
(A5.10)). Again there is rise in market share (area E2) and a fall in unit margin (area 
E l).
From these diagrams we can see that the fall in ul-dl profits under the Partial 
Integration regime will exceed that under the Integrated Regime ((A5.10) is positive) if 
and only if:
(A5.l l)  (B1+B2) + (Cl-C2)/2 - (E1-E2)I2 > A
Since the changes is unit margins are equal by Assumption 5.8 (A = B1 = C l = E l) we
are left with:
(A5.12) B2 + E2/2 > C2/2
(A5.12) is satisfied if B2 £ C2/2. Remember that at p = 0 the unit margin is equal to
P I  P Ithe product value and note that for /3 > 2 > v2 12. Therefore Assumption 5.2 (J3
great enough) ensures that (A5.12) holds.
Q.E.D.
